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Slaughter-House Five:
Views of the Case
DAVID S. BOGEN*
Because I believe that the demise of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
has contributed in no small part to the current disarray of our Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence, I would be open to reevaluating its
meaning in an appropriate case. Before invoking the Clause, however,
we should endeavor to understand what the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment thought that it meant. We should also consider whether the
Clause should displace, rather than augment, portions of our equal pro-
tection and substantive due process jurisprudence.
-Saenz v. Roe (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined byRehnquist, C.J.)'
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."2 The Slaughter-
House Cases said these words did not refer to the fundamental rights of
citizens, but to rights derived from "the Federal government, its national
character, its Constitution or its laws."3 Since that decision, the Supreme
Court has made it clear that the privileges or immunities clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is not itself the source of any rights, and has
turned to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment for protection of "fundamental rights," including incorpora-
tion of some of the Bill of Rights This is the jurisprudence that Justice
* Professor of Law and T. Carroll Brown Scholar, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A.
1962, LL.B. 1965 Harvard University; LL.M. 1967 New York University. I would like to thank Profes-
sor Alan Chen of the University of Denver and Gordon Young here at Maryland as well as faculty at
the University of Denver and the University of Maryland who participated in workshops discussing
the paper. I would also like to thank Jennifer Cupani and Rob Burriesci, Maryland School of Law
class of 2004, for their research assistance on this article.
I. 526 U.S. 489,527-28 (i999).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i.
3. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,79 (1872).
4. See generally Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97, 99 (19o8) (holding source of privileges
and immunities is found in nature and essential character of national government and rights specifi-
cally granted by Constitution; Privileges and Immunities Clause does not incorporate Bill of Rights,
but bill of rights may apply to states through due process clause if fundamental principle of liberty and
justice); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding Freedom of Speech guaranteed by
First Amendment applies to states as requirement of due process under Fourteenth Amendment);
Strauder v. West Virginia, ioo U.S. 303, 310 (188o) (holding racial discrimination in jury pool violates
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Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice William Rehnquist questioned in dis-
sent in Saenz These justices may regret the reevaluation they call for,
because it could overturn the "new federalism" they hold so dear.' How-
ever, this Article contends that the current Fourteenth Amendment ju-
risprudence including the "demise of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause" should be reaffirmed.
The Slaughter-House Cases held that, in the absence of federal legis-
lation, a state did not violate the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment
when it created a monopoly as part of the regulation of an industry that
posed public health dangers.' The result was far less controversial than
the Court's rationale, which distinguished fundamental rights from privi-
leges or immunities. That distinction set the course for analysis of the
privileges or immunities clause and made the Slaughter-House Cases piv-
otal to the understanding of current doctrine.
This Article discusses five different views of the Slaughter-House
Cases. First, this Article examines three views on whether the majority
opinion intended to make the Bill of Rights applicable against the states:
(i) that it was intentionally ambiguous, (2) that it precluded incorpora-
tion, or (3) that it supported incorporation of the Bill of Rights against
the states. Second, the Article takes up Justice Thomas's challenge to re-
evaluate the interpretation of the privileges or immunities clause and
considers whether (4) the Slaughter-House Cases should be overruled or
(5) followed.
The conventional view of Justice Samuel F. Miller's majority opinion
in the Slaughter-House Cases rejects incorporation of the Bill of Rights
against the states through the privileges and immunities clause, but a re-
visionist theory that the opinion supports incorporation8 has been gaining
equal protection clause); Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (holding criminalization of
homosexual conduct violates due process because adults have fundamental right to autonomy in inti-
mate choices).
5. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 52I.
6. James W. Fox, Jr., Re-readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or Immunities,
and Section Five Enforcement Powers, 91 Ky. L.J. 67, 67 (2002) (arguing for congressional power to
interpret the clause under Section 5) [hereinafter Fox, Re-readings and Misreadings]; William J. Rich,
Privileges or Immunities: The Missing Link in Establishing Congressional Power to Abrogate State
Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235, 238 (20o1) [hereinafter Rich, Privileges
or Immunities] (arguing that Privileges and Immunities Clause authorizes Congress to abrogate states'
sovereign immunity when acting to enforce individual rights that Congress has been authorized to pro-
tect); William J. Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional
Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 230 (2002) [hereinafter Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" Seri-
ously] (arguing private causes of action against states are exercises of Section 5 enforcement power).
7. 83 U. S. (Wall.) at 62-65.
8. Robert C. Palmer, The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-House, Cruik-
shank, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 739, 769 (1984); Kevin Christopher
Newsom, Setting Incorporationism Straight: A Reinterpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, io9
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ground.9 Revisionist success could have dramatic effect. First, by suggest-
ing that the Slaughter-House Cases have been misinterpreted, the revi-
sionist view opens the door to switching incorporation doctrine from the
due process clause to the privileges or immunities clause.'" Second, this
view of the Slaughter-House Cases supports total incorporation as articu-
lated by Justice Black, rather than the current process of selective incor-
poration." This would make grand jury indictment, the civil jury, and the
right to bear arms applicable to state government despite the prior Su-
preme Court decisions to the contrary.'2 Third, by basing incorporation
on the Slaughter-House Cases, which repudiated a fundamental rights
approach to the privileges or immunities clause, these articles weaken
the unenumerated rights premise that lies at the heart of cases like Roe v.
Wade. '"
YALE L.J. 643, 647-48 (2000); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Un-
derstanding in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment,
61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051, 1054-55 (2000).
9. Kevin Newsom's lead article in the Yale Law Journal has attracted significant support.
Newsom, supra note 8; see Rich, Taking "Privileges and Immunities" Seriously, supra note 6. at 18o.
Professor Tribe was also apparently persuaded by Newsom's views initially. Lawrence H. Tribe,
Comment, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future-or
Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. I o, 184 n.331 (1999) [hereinafter Tribe, Saenz
Sans Prophecy]. He has subsequently appeared more ambivalent. i LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrrtJTIONAL LAW 1303 n.3 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruriONAL LAW].
to. The premise of Newsom's work is that if Slaughter-House supported incorporation rather
than negating it, the Court will find it easier to accept the privileges and immunities clause as the ap-
propriate vehicle for applying the individual rights protections of the Constitution against the states.
Newsom, supra note 8, at 733-44. But the most Newsom could demonstrate would be that dicta in an
early case was misunderstood. It does not reverse the century of precedent that has relied on the due
process clause to restrict the states and held that privileges and immunities do not support incorpora-
tion. The interesting issue this raises on the role of precedent will not be addressed here.
II. Justice Hugo Black argued that the Bill of Rights was incorporated against the states because
the Rights were specifically mentioned in the Constitution. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The novelty of his theory was that he denied the existence of substantive
due process or any unenumerated rights. His theory would expand the rights of the citizen by making
the Bill of Rights applicable against the state, but cabin the Court's discretion by limiting the applica-
tion to specifically enumerated rights. Although Black claimed support for his theory in history and in
the dissenting opinions of a variety of individual judges, his sources based incorporation on the theory
that the Fourteenth Amendment secured fundamental rights and the stated rights in the Constitution
were examples of fundamental rights and not the only rights protected. Justice Black cited no source
that espoused incorporation with his limitations on it. He seemed to accept the conventional wisdom
of his day that the Slaughter-House Cases had rejected incorporation. Id. at 75-78 (Black, J., dissent-
ing).
12. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 (1876) (civil jury); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 595
(i9oo) (grand jury indictment); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1886) (right to bear arms).
13. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). The move to substantive due process was facilitated by the use of
due process to incorporate the substantive provisions of the Bill of Rights. If substantive guarantees
such as freedom of speech apply to the states as privileges of United States citizenship rather than as
liberty interests, the due process clause would be more likely to be interpreted as purely procedural.
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The dramatic consequences of reinterpreting the Slaughter-House
Cases, especially when several members of the Supreme Court have sig-
naled their willingness to reconsider the current interpretation of the
privileges and immunities clause, prompted this Article.'4 After examin-
ing the Slaughter-House Cases and the different arguments about its
meaning, it concludes that the weight of the evidence supports the con-
ventional wisdom that Justice Miller's majority opinion intended to strip
the privileges or immunities clause of any independent significance and
rejected its use to incorporate the Bill of Rights.'5 Slaughter-House means
just what we thought it meant. Incorporation of the Bill of Rights
through the privileges and immunities clause would require the Court to
reverse that decision as well as every subsequent decision made on the
issue.
The next logical question is whether the Court should overturn the
Slaughter-House Cases 6 as a judicial mistake and center interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment in the privileges and immunities clause. A
wide range of critics, from Justice Thomas to Professor Lawrence Tribe,
have urged the change.'7 They argue that the decision was wrong histori-
cally and that its mistaken approach has created problems for constitu-
tional doctrine that can only be surmounted by the revival of the
privileges and immunities clause." The critics agree on overruling the de-
cision, but they have many different opinions about what that should
lead to. One view emphasizes congressional power to enforce the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and argues for a shift to Congress of much of
the responsibility for interpreting the substance of those terms. 9 Such
deference to congressional interpretation could reverse the Court's new
federalism decisions."
This Article takes another view and concludes that the majority
acted correctly. The common criticism of the Court for nullifying the
This, of course, was the position of Justice Black, although he was willing to use whatever clause the
rest of the Court would vote for. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68-92 (Black, J., dissenting).
14. See infra Parts II and III; supra note 8.
I5. See infra Parts IV and V.
16. Id.
17. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 1317-23; Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,
527-28 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
is. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 9 at 1317-23.
19. See Fox, supra note 6, at 68-70.
20. Deference to congressional determinations that the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States include freedom from threats of guns, sexual violence, and discrimination based on age
or disability would overturn United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (i995), United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2ooo) and perhaps Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) and Bd. of Trs. of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2ooi).
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privileges and immunities clause is misplaced."1 Justice Miller accurately
foresaw the potential of the clause to undermine federalism. Although
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment invested their hopes in the
privileges and immunities clause, the combination of a broad interpreta-
tion of the equal protection clause and the current interpretation of the
due process clause to incorporate many of the Bill of Rights and some
unenumerated rights more accurately reflects their intent than could be
achieved under the privileges or immunities clause. Further, this result
supports a balanced federalism that remains the best hope for resolving a
variety of problems in the nation and the world.
I. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE ONE: SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES DICTA WAS
DELIBERATELY AMBIGUOUS
Although the Slaughter-House Cases repudiated a fundamental
rights construction of the privileges or immunities clause, the Court's
language was less clear on whether the clause incorporated the Bill of
Rights against the state. The fundamental rights discussion provided the
rationale for the holding, but an ambiguous mention of specific constitu-
tional provisions was dicta. Professor Fox has suggested that the ambigu-
ity was deliberate and the majority intended to postpone making any
decision on the point.2 In his view, the case is not a precedent with re-
spect to the use of the privileges or immunities clause to apply the first
eight Amendments against the states.
A. THE RATIONALE'S REJECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was adopted to
deal with the aftermath of slavery and the racial discrimination that pre-
vailed after the Civil War. The first sentence asserts that "All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside."23 This repudiated Taney's Dred Scott opinion on African-
American citizenship. ' The framers wished to secure for all citizens the
privileges and immunities of citizens to which Article IV of the Constitu-
tion referred when it said that "The Citizens of each State shall be enti-
tled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."25
Supporters of the new Amendment intended to make a constitutional
principle of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which stated that citizens
21. See Fox, supra note 6, at 70-72.
22. Id. at 79.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i.
24. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. (s9 How.) 393, 407 (1856) (holding that African Ameri-
cans, whether free or slave, are not citizens).
25. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2.
December 2003]
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shall have the same right ... to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties' and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property, and to [have] full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as
is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, and penalties, and to none other... .6
Every speaker in Congress who touched on the issue during the dis-
cussion of the adoption of the privileges or immunities clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment clause either stated that it was derived from the
privileges and immunities clause of Article IV or that it made the Civil
Rights Act into a constitutional command, or both." Thus, "privileges or
immunities" referred to the fundamental rights that citizens ought to en-
joy in any society, because congressmen understood that the term meant
fundamental rights in Article IV and because the prohibition of racial
discrimination in fundamental rights was the basic principle of the Civil
Rights Act of i866.
The privileges and immunities of citizens that Article IV protected
against discrimination based on state of citizenship were never com-
pletely defined, but congressmen and judges generally described them as
fundamental rights prior to the Fourteenth Amendment.2s They included
rights to acquire and possess property. Northern republicans also claimed
that southern states violated Article IV when they denied free African
Americans and northern whites entrance into the state, rights of speech
within the state, and the ability to sue for their rights in the state courts. 9
26. Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, § I, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
27. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2459 (1866) (Rep. Stevens); id. at 2462 (Rep. Gar-
field); id. at 2465 (Rep. Thayer); id. at 2467 (Rep. Boyer); id. at 2498 (Rep. Broomall); id. at 2502, 2513
(Rep. Raymond); id. at 2511 (Rep. Eliot); id. at 2539 (Rep. Farnsworth); id. at 2542-43 (Rep. Bing-
ham); id. at 2765 (Sen. Howard); id. at 2896 (Sen. Doolittle); id. at 2961 (Sen. Poland); id. at app. 219
(Sen. Howe); id. at 3035 (Sen. Henderson).
28. Senator Lyman Trumbull, proposing the Civil Rights Act, said the rights secured by Article
IV were "such fundamental rights as belong to every free person," citing Bushrod Washington's deci-
sion in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,2 3 0). CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist
Sess. 474 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull). Representative Lawrence of Ohio said "the absolute right to live,
the right of personal security, personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These are
the rights of citizenship." Id. at 1833 (Rep. Lawrence). He then said "the privileges referred to in the
Constitution are such as are fundamental civil rights." Id. at 1836 (Rep. Lawrence).
29. Representative Kasson claimed that slavery should be abolished because it caused a violation
of Article IV privileges and immunities by driving people from the state because of their opinions.
"Did not Massachusetts send two distinguished gentlemen to try a cause affecting the right of South
Carolina over free colored citizens of Massachusetts in the courts of South Carolina, and were they not
driven ignominiously from the city of Charleston, without access to the court?" CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1865) (Rep. Kasson); Representative Smith, citing Article IV, said "That principle
was denied to the whole North by the South unless the man adhered to the sentiments of the South."
Id. at 237 (Rep. Smith); and Representative Higby, referring to the initial proposal for Congressional
power to enforce privileges and immunities, bemoaned the failure to effectuate Article IV that pro-
duced the need for the new amendment: "Had that provision been enforced, a citizen of New York
[Vol. 55:333
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Thus, fundamental rights included affirmative benefits from the state
(e.g., suit in court, enforceable property and contract rights) and negative
rights against state interference (e.g., interstate movement, free speech).
The Civil Rights Act of i866 was the epitome of fundamental rights.
Its principle was that racial discrimination in contract, property, access to
and testimony in courts, in laws for the security of person and property,
or in punishments, deprived citizens of fundamental rights that were
privileges or immunities of citizenship. Republican supporters argued
that the law was a valid exercise of congressional power to enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment, because the failure to treat the individual as a
citizen was a badge or incident of slavery.30
Although congressmen voting on the Fourteenth Amendment be-
lieved that "privileges or immunities" referred to fundamental rights,3'
the Slaughter-House Cases rejected a fundamental rights interpretation
of the clause only five years after the Amendment's ratification.32 The
Slaughter-House Cases arose from a monopoly to operate a slaughter-
house in New Orleans that the Louisiana legislature granted the Crescent
City Livestock Company.33 The justification for regulating slaughter-
houses may have been the stench and pollution produced by massive
slaughtering, but those emissions were a pale reflection of the corruption
of the political process that secured the monopoly.34 Nevertheless, brib-
ery was not the basis for challenging the grant.35
In the Slaughter-House Cases, the plaintiff butchers claimed that the
monopoly violated the Fourteenth Amendment primarily because it de-
prived them of the privilege and immunity of pursuing a trade on terms
applicable to everyone." Counsel for the defendant slaughterhouse com-
would have been treated as a citizen in the State of South Carolina." CONG. GLOBE, 3 9th Cong., Ist
Sess. 1054 (I866) (Rep. Higby).
30. Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, proposing the Civil Rights Act, pointed to privileges and
immunities as fundamental rights in Article IV. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 474 (1866) (Sen.
Trumbull). Then he said that if citizens of other states are entitled to such rights when in a state, "how
much more are the native-born citizens of the State itself entitled to these rights!" Id. at 475 (Sen.
Trumbull). Representative Lawrence of Ohio argued that the Act was justified as a measure to en-
force the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV. Id. at 1835-36 (Rep. Lawrence).
31. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th CONG. 1St SESS. (1866), supra notes 28 and 30.
32. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 6o (1872).
33- Id. at 59-6o.
34. Id. at 59-6s, 64-66.
35. Fletcher v. Peck, io U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 123 081o), ended that route. It held that Georgia vio-
lated the contract clause when it attempted to reverse an agreement with the state that had allegedly
been procured by bribery. Id.
36. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 50-54; Brief for Plaintiffs at 2-3, Slaughter-
House Cases. 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (Nos. 475-80), in 6 PHILIP B. KURLAND & GERHARD CASPER, ED.,
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 537-38 (i975) [hereinafter Brief for Plaintiffs].
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pany accepted the proposition that the privileges and immunities speci-
fied in the Fourteenth Amendment were the fundamental rights of citi-
zens, including the right to pursue a trade, but argued that the
Amendment protected those rights only against discrimination based on
race.
37
Justice Samuel Miller wrote the majority opinion, in which he was
joined by Justices Nathan Clifford, David Davis, William Strong, and
Ward Hunt.8 He rejected the fundamental rights views of the privileges
or immunities clause held by counsel on both sides of the case.39 Mixing
text and policy analysis, Miller concluded that the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States were distinct from the fundamental
rights of citizens.4" The Fourteenth Amendment's text makes citizenship
in the United States depend on place of birth, and state citizenship de-
pend on place of residence.4' Noting that citizenship in the United States
and citizenship in a state are different matters that depend on different
characteristics, Miller said:
It is a little remarkable, if this clause was intended as a protection to
the citizen of a State against the legislative power of his own State, that
the word citizen of the State should be left out when it is so carefully
used, and used in contradistinction to citizens of the United States in
the very sentence which precedes it. It is too clear for argument that
the chane in phraseology was adopted understandingly and with a
purpose.
Justice Miller said that the privileges and immunities protected by
Article IV were those of state citizens.43 Those rights embrace "nearly
37. Brief of Counsel of Defendant in Error at 4-9, Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872)
(Nos. 475-8o), in 6 PHILIP B. KURLAND & GERHARD CASPER, EDS., LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 609--14 (1975) [hereinafter Brief
of Counsel of Defendant in Error].
38. Miller began by showing that regulation of slaughterhouses was within the police power of the
states, and noting that all state constitutional issues had been resolved by the state court. Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (t6 Wall.) at 61-66. He then discussed the adoption of the Civil War Amend-
ments, observing that the monopoly was a servitude on property (prohibiting use as slaughter house)
rather than of person, and therefore the Thirteenth Amendment did not apply. Id. at 66-74. He then
moved to the privileges and immunities argument. Id. at 73-83.
39. Bryan Wildenthal suggested that incorporationist arguments in the plaintiffs' brief indicate
incorporation was on the mind of the justices and that Miller's opinion should be read to support that
theory. Wildenthal, supra note 8, at I I I. However, Miller rejected the fundamental rights interpreta-
tion of the amendment that the briefs on both sides supported. See generally Brief of Counsel of De-
fendant in Error, supra note 37 and Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 36. The losing briefs subtle
reference to incorporation based on a fundamental rights theory should not affect the interpretation of
an opinion that flatly rejects the main thesis proposed.
40. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (I6 Wall.) at 76-81.
41. Id. at 8o.
42. Id. at 74.
43. Id. at 76.
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every civil right for the establishment and protection of which organized
government is instituted. They are... those rights which are fundamen-
tal[,]" and they encompass "the class of rights which the State govern-
ments were created to establish and secure."' But those privileges were
secured only against discrimination based on state of citizenship. If a
state denied a fundamental right to its own citizens, it could deny it to
others.45 Miller argued these privileges and immunities in Article IV were
quite distinct from the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 46 The right to pursue a
trade was a fundamental right of citizenship within Article IV's protec-
tion against discrimination based on state residence.47 It was not, how-
ever, a privilege or immunity of United States citizenship.48 An
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges and immunities
clause that gave Congress power to legislate on the rights of person and
property protected under Article IV would vastly expand Congressional
power, and Miller argued that the clause should not have that effect.49
According to Justice Miller, a fundamental rights construction of the
Fourteenth Amendment "radically changes the whole theory of the rela-
tions of the State and Federal governments to each other and of both
these governments to the people,"50 and it should not be adopted unless
the language was clear. Fundamental rights, such as the right to pursue
an occupation, belong to the citizen of a state only in his capacity as a
state citizen, and "they are left to the State governments for security and
protection, and not by this article placed under the special care of the
Federal government."'" Therefore the plaintiff butchers had no rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities clause.
B. THE DICTA'S AMBIGUITY ON INCORPORATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Having rejected a fundamental rights interpretation, Justice Miller
offered dicta on the substance of the clause: "[L]est it should be said that
no such privileges and immunities are to be found if those we have been
considering are excluded, we venture to suggest some which owe their
44. Id.
45- Id. at 74-
46. Id. at 74-75, 81.
47. Id. at 8o-8i.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 77-78.
50. Id. at 78.
51. Id.
December 2003]
HASTINGS LA W JOURNAL
existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitu-
tion, or its laws."5
All of the privileges and immunities Miller then mentioned had their
source outside the clause. Almost all seemed unaffected by the adoption
of the Amendment: the right to travel, to the protection of the federal
government abroad, to use navigable waters, and to obtain rights under
treaties were recognized before the Amendment. 3 Other privileges were
secured by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments with
no suggestion that the privileges or immunities clause had any effect on
their substance. Only one phrase in Miller's list of the privileges and im-
munities of national citizenship had any potential for a substantive im-
pact. Justice Miller stated: "The right to peaceably assemble and petition
for redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are
rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."54
The right of assembly and petition is stated in the First Amendment:
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging ... the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for redress of
grievances."55 This recognizes the existence of the right, but operates only
to limit Congress. Habeas is mentioned in Article I, section 9, which pro-
vides: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it."'56 The placement of the clause in Section 9 demonstrates
that it only applies to the federal government.57 Justice Miller's reference
to these rights did not mention that the Constitution only limited their
impairment by the federal government.
There are at least three ways to interpret Miller's references to the
right of peaceable assembly and habeas corpus: (I) as an acknowledg-
ment of the status quo, (2) as privileges found in the structure of federal-
ism, or(3) as concrete instances of natural rights. First, Miller's reference
to the constitutional provisions could mean that the privileges and im-
munities clause recognized the status quo and simply preserved it. The
constitutional rights mentioned were privileges, but their scope was un-
52. Id. at 79. In the remainder of the opinion, Miller disposed of the due process and equal pro-
tection arguments. He said that regulation of trade was not a deprivation of property under the due
process clause, and that equal protection was primarily concerned with discrimination against African
Americans and plaintiffs failed to make a strong case to have it apply to their situation. Id. at 79-83.
53. Id. at 79-80. E.g., Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867) (right to travel); Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, I97 (r824) (use of navigable waters within state); Fairfax's Devi-
see v. Hunter's Lessee, iI U.S. (7 Cranch) 6o3, 627 (1813) (rights under treaties).
54. Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
55. U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
57. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74-75.
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changed. Second, the phrase could refer to the right to petition the fed-
eral government or to bring habeas corpus in federal court, rights with
which states could never interfere. These rights are implicit in the federal
structure created by the Constitution, regardless of any specific express
language. If so, their mention implied nothing about the application of
other constitutional provisions to the states. Third, the reference could
mean that the abstract right protected against federal interference was
now protected from abridgment by the state. In other words, the right ex-
isted as natural law apart from the Constitution, and its mention in the
Constitution made that general principle a privilege of United States citi-
zenship.
i. Declaring the Status Quo
The most natural understanding of habeas corpus, assembly, and pe-
tition as "rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution" is
that they refer to the rights defined by the Constitution." If rights "owe
their existence" to the Constitution, the Constitution determines their
scope." No other constitutional rights were altered by inclusion in
Miller's list of privileges or immunities. 6' Thus, the natural inference is
that Miller was listing the privileges of national citizenship that existed
when the amendment was adopted, not changing their substance.
Justice Miller did not quote the Constitution exactly when he said
the rights "were guaranteed by the Federal Constitution."6 ' "The right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances" was a short
form of "the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. 6 ' There is no reason to believe
that Miller thought the right extended beyond petitioning the govern-
ment to reach petitioning private individuals. Similarly, his reference to
the writ of habeas corpus did not mention suspension in cases of rebel-
lion and invasion.63 The failure to quote the entire clause is no indication
that he thought the privilege or immunities of citizens of the United
States with respect to habeas corpus extended further than the stated
limits in Article I, section 9.64 Since Miller's language is a shorthand ref-
erence to rights whose substance is found in the Constitution, the limits
there would seem to be the extent of the privilege or immunity.
58. Id. at 79.
59. Id.
6o. Id. at 79-82.
61. Id. at 79.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 79-80.
64. Id. at 79.
December 2003]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Confining the impact of the right to assemble and habeas corpus to
limits on the federal government is consistent with other rights on
Miller's list of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States. He included privileges relevant to the federal government alone,
e.g., "to demand the care and protection of the Federal government over
his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or within the jurisdic-
tion of a foreign government."6 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibition
against state denial of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States surely did not mean that states must afford care and pro-
tection to citizens abroad. The right to protection abroad remained only
a right to have federal protection. Similarly, Miller's mention of the
rights of assembly and habeas corpus may simply refer to examples of ex-
isting privileges of citizenship without altering their character from re-
strictions of federal power to restrictions of state power.
The "right of citizenship guaranteed by the Federal Constitution"'66 is
only against the federal government. Congress shall not abridge the right
of assembly and petition, and the federal government will not suspend
the writ of habeas corpus. Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Congress could enact laws to prevent states from attempting to
force the federal government to suspend the writ of habeas corpus or to
take action against peaceable assembly." The privileges and immunities
clause under this interpretation simply declared the status quo. It made
express what had always been implicit in the supremacy clause-that
states could not abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States-and it reinforced congressional power to protect them.
2. Noncommital Structural Rights
According to the status quo interpretation, Justice Miller listed ha-
beas and petition because they were in the Constitution. Alternatively,
Miller may have chosen them because they were based on access to the
federal government. 68 He did not mention such prominent rights as free-
dom of speech, freedom of religion, warrant requirements, or even trial
by jury, which have constitutional protection only by inclusion in the
text.6 Instead, he referred to two rights that had a dual nature. Both ha-
beas and petition were inherent in the federal structure so that states
65. Id.
66. Id. at 79.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
68. Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 654 (1994); ROBERT KACZOROWSKI,
THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL
RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 152 (John H. Baker et al. eds., Oceana Publications, Inc. 1985).
69. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (06 Wall.) at 79-80.
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could not interfere with them, and expressly protected by the Constitu-
tion against federal interference. They provided a transition into a list of
rights that other clauses of the Constitution, including the Civil War
amendments themselves, specifically applied against state governments.
The right to assemble and petition government is not limited to fed-
eral access today, but the Supreme Court had not definitively interpreted
the right when Miller wrote Slaughter-House. The First Amendment ap-
plied only against the federal government, and federal interference with
petitions to state or local government would not have been a plausible
exercise of federal power. Thus, the First Amendment right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress of
grievances might reasonably have been interpreted to refer to assembly
for the purpose of petitioning the federal government. However, as the
Court said only a few years later, the right to petition the federal gov-
ernment for redress of grievances is a privilege or immunity of federal
citizenship that does not depend upon any express constitutional provi-
sion.7" State interference affects access to the federal government, which
abridges a privilege of citizens of the United States under the reasoning
used in Crandall v. Nevada.7'
Miller referred to assembly and petition and habeas immediately af-
ter discussing two rights that are derived from the structure of the Con-
stitution and not from specific constitutional provisions-the right to
travel and the right to federal protection while abroad.72 Both rights were
based on the citizen's relationship to the institutions of the federal gov-
ernment. If assembly is part of the process of petitioning the federal gov-
ernment for redress of grievances, the right is both inferred from the
structure of government and protected by the First Amendment. If the
writ of habeas corpus is basic to vindication of federal rights, it might also
be inferred from the supremacy clause as well as its mention in Article I.
Indeed, in prohibiting the suspension of the writ, Article I assumes its ex-
istence.
The federal access interpretation is linguistically possible, but it is
less persuasive than the status quo view. The passage seems to make the
point that the rights are privileges because the Constitution guarantees
them. Further, the Court intimated only a few years later that the First
70. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876).
71. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867) (holding that a tax on leaving the state was unconstitutional
because it interfered with the right of citizens to access the institutions of the federal government).
72. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79. Even if Miller identified the right of assembly
entirely with the First Amendment, that would not suggest that he believed the Fourteenth Amend-
ment altered the impact of the First. It would simply point to a status quo reading. Cf Palmer, supra
note 8, at 750-5 1.
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Amendment right was broader than access to petition the federal gov-
ernment. 3 Nevertheless, the choice of petition and habeas from among
all the other rights contained in the Constitution suggests that Miller did
not mean that the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment altered the scope of any existing privilege. On the other
hand, the choice of constitutional rights that were enforceable against the
states does not exclude the possibility of incorporation.
3. Incorporation
The third interpretation of Miller's opinion is that reference to a
right in the Constitution made the abstract right a privilege or immunity
of federal citizenship that states could not abridge. Miller did not ex-
pressly mention the restricted scope of the constitutional rights he men-
tioned. Substituting Miller's description as one specific instance of the
general phrase, the Fourteenth Amendment would read, "no state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge 'the right to peaceably as-
semble and petition for redress of grievances.'
The main attraction of reading Miller's opinion to refer to a general-
ized right of assembly and petition as a privilege of citizenship of the
United States is that it is closer to the framers' intention for the privileges
and immunities clause than an interpretation that renders the provision a
tautology. The main problem is that this reading conflicts with the opin-
ion's thrust.
Justice Miller never expressly said that the privileges and immunities
clause incorporated the Bill of Rights. Two separate and apparently in-
consistent things must be true in order to infer that he intended his opin-
ion to support incorporation. First, his references to habeas and
peaceable assembly and petition must refer to the rights specified in the
Constitution and must depend upon that mention for their existence as a
privilege or immunity. Otherwise, their mention offers no support for
applying to the states any other constitutional restrictions on the federal
government.74 Second, Miller's reference must be to an abstract right of
assembly and petition free from limits of the actual constitutional right.
Otherwise, it offers no support for altering the privilege from a limit on
the federal government to a limit on the state. But despite the difficulties
of this reading of the clause, it is at least possible linguistically.
73. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551.
74. It is probably true that the reference is the right specified in the Constitution, but, as the pre-
vious subsection shows, it is not necessarily so.
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C. WHETHER THE AMBIGUITY WAS DELIBERATE?
It is possible that Miller had no firm intention with respect to incor-
poration. He felt compelled to say something about the content of the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, but his com-
ments were all dicta. The opinion drew plenty of fire for its rejection of
fundamental rights: a little strategic ambiguity on incorporation would
not be a bad idea. Professor James Fox has argued that the ambiguity of
the dicta gave Miller and the court time to more fully consider the issue
of incorporation at another day.75 There is no "smoking gun" to prove
that the majority wanted to be ambiguous. The argument that the ambi-
guity was intentional focuses on the existence of ambiguity, the failure of
the analysts to discuss the issue, and the lack of any necessity to resolve
the issue. The idea of deliberate ambiguity with respect to incorporation
gains some support from the treatment of the opinion by scholars of the
time who seemed to see it as merely confirming their own ideas.
The incorporation aspect of the Slaughter-House Cases was of little
interest to contemporaries reacting to the decision. The crucial issue was
that the distinction between privileges of federal and state citizenship
made the Fourteenth Amendment privileges or immunities clause inap-
plicable to fundamental rights of citizenship including property and con-
tract. Any discussion of incorporation was dicta. Academic reaction
focused on the majority's rejection of fundamental rights of citizenship,
and paid no attention to what that rejection meant for incorporation.
Some reports merely noted or quoted from the case without signifi-
cant comment.76 Others commented only on the fundamental rights hold-
ing and ignored any implication the opinion might have had with respect
to incorporation. The Nation supported the decision, but focused on the
difference between the dissenters and the majority with respect to a fun-
damental rights interpretation of the clause.77 William Royall roasted the
court in the Southern Law Review for failing to pay attention to congres-
sional debates.,8 Royall's article buttresses the contention that contempo-
75. Fox, supra note 6, at 79-80; see also TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at
1307.
76. Summary of Events: United States, 7 AM. L. REV. 732,742 (1873).
77. The Supreme Court Righting Itself, i6 NATION 28o (Apr. 24, 1873), cited in VI CHARLES FAIR-
MAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88,
PART ONE, at 1371 (Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise, Macmillan 1971). In Monopolies and the Four-
teenth Amendment, io NATION 361, 362 (Dec. 1, 1870), the editors had expressed dismay at the Circuit
Court decision in the case that would have invalidated the Louisiana Law.
78. See generally William Royall, The Fourteenth Amendment: The Slaughter House Cases, 4 S. L.
REv. 558 (1878). Charles Fairman claimed that Royall's writings were intended to use the amendment
to oppose Republican domination and in particular to back bondholders against a movement to repu-
diate Virginia state debt. FAIRMAN, supra note 77, at 1371-74.
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raries thought that the privileges and immunities clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment guaranteed fundamental rights, but it provides no
support for believing that Miller's opinion advanced that cause.79 All
these articles simply ignored the significance, if any, of Miller's reference
to habeas corpus, assembly and petition as privileges of United States
citizenship.
The declaratory status quo interpretation of Miller's opinion re-
ceived some support from the writings of Thomas Cooley. The third edi-
tion of his Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations (1874) referred to
the understanding that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal gov-
ernment. A footnote stated, as it had in the 1871 edition:
For instance, though the right of trial by jury is preserved by the Con-
stitution of the United States, the States may, nevertheless, if they
choose, provide for the trial of all offences against the States, as well as
the trial of civil cases in the State courts, without the intervention of a
jury."°
Elsewhere in the book, he noted that the Fourteenth Amendment
"received a very careful examination at the hands of the Supreme Court"
in the Slaughter-House Cases.8 Cooley's attention to that opinion with-
out suggesting any change in his jury trial note intimates that he thought
Miller did not support incorporation.8' By the next edition in 1878, the
Court's rejection of incorporation was clearer, and the footnote language
was moved directly into the text.83
Unlike Cooley, John Norton Pomeroy thought that the federal gov-
ernment ought to be able to prevent the states from violating the princi-
ples of the Bill of Rights. He said in his Introduction to the Constitutional
Law of the United States that the Fourteenth Amendment would enable
the federal government to do precisely that.s4 After the decision in the
Slaughter-House Cases, he left this prior discussion untouched, and as-
serted in an appendix that "[i]n no instance has any proposition or doc-
trine stated in the text been expressly declared erroneous and rejected by
79. See Royall, supra note 78.
80. THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 19, n.I (3d ed. 1874).
81. Id. at 294n.2.
82. Cooley also noted in his revised fourth edition of Story's Commentaries on the Constitution
that his views were "fortunately in harmony" with Miller's opinion in Slaughter-House. 2 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 693 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., Little
Brown 4 th ed. 1873) (1833). See discussion in Wildenthal, supra note 8, at 113o-33.
83. THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 25 (4th ed. 1878).
84. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
151, at § 237 (1870).
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the Supreme Court of the United States ... ,,.. Nevertheless, his discus-
sion of the Slaughter-House Cases suggests that he did not see in it an
endorsement of incorporation. After paraphrasing Miller's explication of
the two sets of privileges and immunities, state and federal, in which the
fundamental rights of state citizens remain matters for the state alone,
Pomeroy wrote: "Nor does the amendment purport to define, much less
to create any 'privileges or immunities' which are peculiar to national
citizenship. The Court forbears to enumerate these privileges and immu-
nities and the opinion upon this particular subject is very unsatisfac-
tory."86 He insisted that the dissenters were correct in viewing privileges
and immunities as the fundamental rights of citizens, and they would
eventually carry the day.8' Miller had not "expressly declared erroneous"
the proposition that the federal government could enforce the rights in
the Bill of Rights aainst the states, but Pomeroy does not suggest that
Miller supported it. Pomeroy rejected Miller's approach and criticized
its failure to enumerate privileges of national citizenship despite Miller's
list of such privileges."'
In sum, scholars writing about the opinion immediately after the de-
cision paid little attention to whether the dicta implicitly supported or re-
jected incorporation. Cooley and Pomeroy took opposing positions on
incorporation and the Slaughter-House Cases did not cause them to
change their text, but neither author explicitly worked through how the
opinion affected incorporation. The scholars' confusion and inattention
to the incorporation issue supports the contention that the opinion was
ambiguous, but it falls far short of showing that the ambiguity was delib-
erate.
II. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE Two: SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES RENDERED THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE REDUNDANT
The initial academic uncertainty about the impact of the Slaughter-
House Cases on incorporation was not reflected in the Court. From the
dissents in the decision itself to the use of the case in subsequent opin-
ions, the Court has consistently interpreted the Slaughter-House Cases to
deny that the privileges or immunities clause incorporated the Bill of
Rights. The opinion's arguable ambiguity flows from the biases of its
readers and not the intention of its author. Most commentators have ac-
85. JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
519 § 761 (New York, Hurd & Houghton 3d ed. 1876).
86. Id. at 527 i 705.
87. Id. at 532 § 767.
88. Id. at 530-31 § 767.
89. Id. at 531 § 767.
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cepted this view of the decision, and complained that it renders the privi-
leges or immunities clause useless.'
The Court's position denies any independent force to the clause. If
all privileges or immunities are derived from sources other than the
clause, states could not abridge them even if the clause did not exist. Pro-
fessor William Rich has argued that recognition of privileges and immu-
nities in Section i is not useless because it is a vehicle for the exercise of
congressional power to enforce privileges or immunities under Section
5.91 Rich contends that this overcomes the new federalism decisions on
state sovereign immunity.92 However, it seems unlikely that a Court that
finds sovereign immunity implicit in the Constitution will change its
views when presented with a privileges or immunities argument. Thus,
the conventional view and current doctrine make the privileges and im-
munities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment largely redundant.
A. THE DISSENTERS' CRITIQUE: "A VAIN AND IDLE ENACTMENT" 93
Justice Stephen J. Field dissented vigorously in the Slaughter-House
Cases, joined by Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase and Justices Joseph Brad-
ley and Noah Swayne.94 Justice Field insisted that the privileges and im-
munities of citizenship were the fundamental rights of citizens of all free
countries, rights mentioned in the Civil Rights Act, referred to by Article
IV, and described by members of Congress during the debates.9' The
monopoly's exclusion of the plaintiff butchers from the slaughterhouse
business denied them equality of rights in a fundamental area?6 Field cas-
tigated Miller's majority opinion for stripping the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of any force:
If this.., only refers, as held by the majority of the court in the opin-
ion, to such privileges and immunities as were before its adoption spe-
cifically designated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as
belonging to citizens of the United States, it was a vain and idle enact-
ment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited
Congress and the people on its passage. With privileges and immuni-
ties thus designated or implied no State could ever have interfered by
90. See Aynes, supra note 68, at 686.
91. Rich, Privileges or Immunities, supra note 6, at 304; Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities"
Seriously, supra note 6, at 159.
92. Acceptance of the privileges or immunities argument would change the result in Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 0997), Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (i999), Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(i999), Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2ooo), and Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2oo).
93. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (6 Wall.) 36, 96 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 95 (Field, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 9o-91 (Field, J., dissenting).
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its laws, and no new constitutional provision was required to inhibit
such interference. The supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of
the United States always controlled any State legislation of that charac-
ter.97
Critics who urge an incorporation reading of the majority opinion
dismiss Field's attack on the grounds that he was just reacting to Miller's
rejection of fundamental rights." However, Field's language ("a vain and
idle enactment, which accomplished nothing") strongly supports the view
that Miller wrote a status quo opinion."
As Justice Field explained in his dissent, the framers believed that
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" described the
inherent fundamental rights of citizens with respect to government, so
that the prohibition on state abridgment made the rights legally bind-
ing.I" The amendment was to convert an "ought" into an "is." The lan-
guage worked because the rights applied to the states before the
amendment, although they were not legally enforceable. There was no
change in the definition of privileges of citizens of the United States, only
a change in whether they were enforceable.
Without a fundamental rights interpretation, however, incorporation
does not work linguistically. Incorporation converts a right against the
federal government into a right against the state that the federal govern-
ment can enforce. There was no privilege or immunity of citizens of the
United States to be free of state restrictions on assembly and petition
prior to the Fourteenth Amendment; but, according to incorporation
theory, prohibiting the states from abridging the privileges or immunities
97. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
98. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 196 n.59 (I98O).
99. Bryan Wildenthal suggested that when Field said "grants of exclusive privileges... are op-
posed to the whole theory of free government, and it requires no aid from any bill of rights to render
them void," he was accusing Miller and the majority of relying on the Bill of Rights as a referent for
the scope of privileges and immunities. Wildenthal, supra note 8, at 1095. The phrase followed Field's
condemnation of the majority for upholding a law that failed to recognize the equality of right in law-
ful pursuits. Thus, Wildenthal infers that Field thought Miller required the Bill of Rights to be appli-
cable in order to find state action void. However, Field was quoting from an opinion of the Supreme
Court of Connecticut that invalidated a state grant of a monopoly despite the absence of any direct
constitutional provision against it, and the words which follow "Bill of Rights" in that opinion are "the
first section of which declares that 'no man or set of men, are entitled to exclusive public emoluments,
or privileges from the community,' to render them void." Norwich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich City Gas
Co., 25 Conn. 19, 38 (1856). Thus, the "Bill of rights" in the cite was not the federal one but the decla-
ration in Connecticut. Perhaps Field intended to shift the sense of the word in his paraphrase of the
Connecticut court in order to allude to the doctrine of incorporation, but it is far more likely that he
simply used the quote to illustrate his position that privileges or immunities were fundamental rights
derived from natural law. This leaves us with Field's sweeping condemnation of the majority opinion
for rendering the privileges and immunities clause a nullity.
ioo. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 93 (Field, J., dissenting).
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of citizens of the United States made it one. That would create something
from nothing. Justice Field's stinging dissent demonstrates that he and
the dissenters who joined him did not believe that Justice Miller and the
majority were attempting such alchemy.'
Justice Bradley also wrote a separate dissenting opinion with which
Justice Swayne concurred. Bradley insisted that pursuit of an employ-
ment was a privilege of citizenship and the monopoly unreasonably
abridged it.' °2 He argued that the state could regulate fundamental rights,
but could not subvert them.' 3 Bradley was very specific that these fun-
damental rights included restrictions against government found in the
Constitution:
The Constitution, it is true, as it stood prior to the recent amendments,
specifies, in terms, only a few of the personal privileges and immunities
of citizens, but they are very comprehensive in their character. The
States were merely prohibited from passing bills of attainder, ex post
facto laws, laws impairing the obligation of contracts, and perhaps one
or two more. But others of the greatest consequence were enumerated,
although they were only secured, in express terms, from invasion by
the Federal government; such as the right of habeas corpus, the right of
trial by jury, of free exercise of religious worship, the right of free
speech and a free press, the right peaceably to assemble for the discus-
sion of public measures, the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and above all, and including almost all the rest,
the right of not being deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."'4
Although Bradley noted rights protected "in express terms" only
against the federal government, he indicated that all the privileges and
immunities applied against the states because they were fundamental. 5
He said "even if the Constitution were silent, the fundamental privileges
and immunities of citizens, as such, would be no less real and no less in-
violable than they now are."' 6 Thus, incorporation for Justice Bradley
was based on the fundamental rights theory that Miller's opinion for the
majority repudiated.
Finally, Justice Swayne wrote separately in addition to concurring in
the dissents of both Field and Bradley. He left the application of princi-
ple primarily to their dissents, but he was anxious to add his own state-
ment of regret about the decision. Swayne began his remarks by
distinguishing "privileges and immunities" of citizens of a state and citi-
Iot. See id. at 83 (Field, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
104. I. at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
io6. Id. at i 9 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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zens of the United States in terms that looked similar to those Miller
used."° But the resemblance was only superficial."8 Swayne said "the
privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States include, among
other things, the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property, and
also the rights which pertain to him by reason of his membership of the
Nation."'" By finding fundamental rights were privileges of citizens of
the United States, Justice Swayne made a critical turn that Justice Miller
did not. Swayne's distinction was primarily between the particular and
the abstract. State law (statutory and constitutional) was the concrete
embodiment of fundamental rights. Property may be a fundamental
right, but the specific rules for recognizing property rights are matters of
local law. If the rules were consistent with fundamental rights, the Four-
teenth Amendment did not change them or give Congress power to
change them. But if the state law violated fundamental rights, Swayne
would hold it unconstitutional.
Justice Swayne specifically criticized the majority for failing to make
the limits against the federal government applicable to the states." ' He
said that the majority opinion
turns what was meant for bread into a stone. By the Constitution, as it
stood before the war, ample protection was given against oppression
by the Union, but little was given against wrong and oppression by the
States. That want was intended to be supplied by this amendment.
Against the former this court has been called upon more than once to
interpose. Authority of the same amplitude was intended to be con-
ferred as to the latter. But this arm of our iurisdiction is, in these cases,
stricken down by the judgment just given.'
107. Justice Swayne noted:
All those which belong to the citizen of a state except as to bills of attainder, ex post facto
laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are left to the guardianship of the bills
of rights, constitutions, and laws of the States respectively. Those rights may all be enjoyed
in every State by the citizens of every other State by virtue of clause 2, section 4, article i, of
the Constitution of the United States as it was originally framed. This section does not in
anywise affect them; such was not its purpose.
Id. at 126-27 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
io8. Bryan Wildenthal suggests that Swayne's dissent supports an incorporationist reading of the
majority opinion because his dual privileges analysis followed Miller, yet he joined Bradley's opinion
which explicitly found the privileges and immunities clause included provisions from the Bill of Rights.
Wildenthal, supra note 8, at 1104-105. This misses Swayne's statement that fundamental rights are
federal privileges or immunities. By joining Justice Bradley, Swayne divided privileges of state citizen-
ship and national citizenship in a manner radically different from Justice Miller, because Justice Brad-
ley insisted that the Bill of Rights were privileges and immunities under the Fourtccnth ,-
because they were fundamental rights and not because they were mentioned in the Constitution.
io9. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 126 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
i to. Id. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
i ii. Id. at 130 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
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In sum, the dissenters agreed that Miller had rejected fundamental
rights. Justice Bradley believed that provisions of the Bill of Rights were
among the fundamental rights that the privileges and immunities clause
should have protected, but joined with Swayne and Chase in Field's dis-
sent castigating Miller for making the amendment into a "vain and idle
enactment, which accomplished nothing ..... Swayne also separately at-
tacked Miller for failure to find in the clause the same power to restrain
the states that existed to restrain federal action.
If Miller was replying to the dissent, he could have said plainly that
the clause made the limits on the federal government applicable to the
states. That would have responded directly to Swayne and given the lie
to Field's accusations. In light of their criticism, Miller's failure to state
expressly that the clause incorporated the Bill of Rights against the states
is powerful evidence that he thought it did not.
B. SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS: SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES AS PRECEDENT FOR
A STATUS Quo ANTE INTERPRETATION
The best evidence of Miller's meaning is the view he and the other
justices in the majority subsequently took of the case and the issues in it.
After the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, when the Court con-
sidered the application of the original amendments to the states, it held
they did not apply.' 3 When parties used the Fourteenth Amendment to
claim rights that were enumerated in the original amendments to the
Constitution, the Court reasoned that such rights were fundamental
rights of citizenship, and not ones relating to national government struc-
ture."4 This used Slaughter-House reasoning to deny incorporation, and
soon the Court began to cite Slaughter-House for that purpose.
Before the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court had held unanimously
that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over a claimed violation by a state of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, because those amendments did not ap-
ply to state government."5 Counsel in Twitchell v. Pennsylvania"6 failed
to raise the newly enacted Fourteenth Amendment, so the Court was not
112. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
113. See infra notes 117, 118, 124, 219 and accompanying text discussing Twitchell v. Pennsylvania,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1868); see infra notes II9-23 and accompanying text discussing Edwards v. El-
liot, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (r874); see infra notes 126, 127 and accompanying text discussing Walker v.
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876).
114. See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text discussing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1876).
115. See infra notes st6-28, 124, 219 and accompanying text discussing Twitchell, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
at 321.
116. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 321-27.
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squarely presented with the incorporation issue."7 Nevertheless, if mem-
bers of the Court thought the new Amendment made the others applica-
ble to the states, it seems surprising that they would allow Twitchell's
execution on the basis that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not ap-
ply. 
s
The year after Slaughter-House, counsel cited it in Edwards v. Elli-
ott"9 to show that the trial by jury was not a privilege or immunity of citi-
zenship of the United States. The defendant contended inter alia that the
state lien law conflicted with the right of trial by jury, saying it abridged a
privilege or immunity of a citizen of the United States protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.' Unfortunately, the record did not indicate
that this challenge had been specifically made in the courts below. 2' Op-
posing counsel, A.Q. Keasbey, said the argument was an afterthought
and needed no reply. 22 But then, citing the portion of the Slaughter-
House Cases discussing the fundamental rights of citizens under Article
IV, Keasbey said:
[Tihe constitutional provisions referred to did not profess to control
the power of the State governments over the rights of its own citizens,
but only to declare that as the States grant them to their own citi-
zens ... the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the
rights of citizens of other States within their jurisdiction. '
In other words, the right to trial by jury and other protections of the
Bill of Rights were fundamental rights applicable to citizens as citizens of
a state through Article IV and not privileges of U.S. citizenship except
against violation by the federal government and except as protected by
Article IV.
Justice Nathan Clifford, a member of the Slaughter-House majority,
found that the federal constitutional issue was not raised below in state
court, and he rejected the defendant's argument for that reason. How-
117. Id. at 513-t4.
18. Twitchell actually committed suicide in his cell on the day set for execution. Philadelphia
Timeline, 1868 (excerpted from RUDOLPH J. WALTHER, HAPPENINGS IN YE OLDE PHILADELPHIA, 168o-
I9OO (1925)), http://www.ushistory.org/philadelphia/timeline/1868.htm. Justice Joseph Bradley joined
the court after Twitchell, and his separate dissent was the only opinion in Slaughter-House to say ex-
pressly that provisions of the amendments were applicable to the states. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 1 18-19
(1872).
119. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532, 549 (1874).
120. "The State law in effect takes away or obstructs the right of trial by jury, and so abridges one
of 'the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.' ... These matters all fall within the
fourteenth amendment." Id. at 544 (argument of D. McMahon for plaintiff in error).
121. The defendant's primary argument, however, was that a lien on a ship being built was a mari-
time lien and that states had no jurisdiction over such liens. Id. at 541.
122. Id. at 548.
123. Id. at 548-49 (argument of A.Q. Keasbey).
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ever, Clifford also said for a unanimous court that the Seventh Amend-
ment does not apply to trials in state court, citing Twitchell'24 as well as
cases decided prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, and Cooley's Treatise
on Constitutional Limitations.'5
Two years later in Walker v. Sauvinet,'26 Chief Justice Morrison
Waite cited Edwards for the proposition that the right to trial by jury in
the Seventh Amendment applied only to trials in federal court:
The States, so far as this amendment is concerned, are left to regulate
trials in their own courts in their own way. A trial by jury in suits at
common law pending in the state courts is not, therefore, a privilege or
immunity of national citizenship, which the States are forbidden by the
Fourteenth Amendment to abridge.'27
Waite made it clear that his analysis was consistent with the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases when he wrote United States v. Cruikshank"s later that
year. "The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United
States and a citizen of a State, but his rights of citizenship under one of
these governments will be different from those he has under the other.
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 74..' .9
Chief Justice Waite focused on whether the federal government had
power to legislate against private acts of violence interfering with assem-
bly or carrying weapons. He characterized the right of the people to as-
semble as "one of the attributes of citizenship under a free
government."'30 Under the reasoning of Slaughter-House,'3  a fundamen-
tal right of that nature would be a privilege of state citizenship and not
federal citizenship. Waite discussed the constitutional provisions of the
Bill of Rights prior to the Civil War as restraints on Congress. The right
of assembly was not guaranteed by the First Amendment "except as
against congressional interference," and the power to protect the funda-
mental right of assembly was placed in the states and "has never been
surrendered to the United States.' ' 32 Congress would have power to pro-
tect freedom of assembly only if the assembly and petition related to
Congress itself or was otherwise connected to performance of national
duties. Thus, protection in petitioning Congress was a privilege of United
States citizenship, but not because it was mentioned in the Constitu-
124. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1868).
125. Edwards, 88 U.S. at 532, 557; see discussion of COOLEY supra text accompanying notes 8o-83.
126. 92 U.S. 90 (1876).
127. Id. at 92.
128. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
129. Id. at 549.
130. Id. at 551.
131. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
132. Crnkshank, 92 U.S. at 552.
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tion.'33 With respect to assembly generally, or bearing arms, the federal
government had no power to legislate against private action and only the
states could act.
Although Chief Justice Waite had not been on the Court when
Slaughter-House was decided, most of the other members of the Court,
including Justice Miller, had been. If Miller thought that the Chief Justice
had misread the case, he had the opportunity to clarify it."4 Instead, Jus-
tice Miller urged Waite to cite the Slaughter-House Cases to support the
reasoning, and Miller specifically approved the opinion, joining Waite's
opinions in both Cruikshank"' and Walker."
6
Professor Robert Palmer saw Cruikshank as the critical decision,
subjecting it to harsh criticism.'37 He argued that Cruikshank was an in-
correct interpretation of the Slaughter-House Cases, and that Miller's si-
lence about its misunderstanding of his opinion was due to the nature of
133. Kevin Newsom contended that Waite's discussion of the right of assembly showed that he
supported incorporation, citing Waite's reference to "the right of the people peaceably to assemble for
the purpose of petitioning Congress for the redress of grievances" as a reference to the First Amend-
ment right. Newsom, supra note 8, at 716. However, the preceding paragraph of Waite's opinion de-
scribed the amendment as a broader right.
[The amendment] assumes the existence of the right of the people to assemble for lawful
purposes, and protects it against encroachment by Congress. The right was not created by
the amendment; neither was its continuance guaranteed, except against congressional inter-
ference. For their protection in its enjoyment, therefore, the people must look to the States.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551. Only after establishing that the right to assemble was not a privilege of
national citizenship, did Chief Justice Waite discuss assembly for petitioning Congress for redress of
grievances "or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the national government"
as a privilege of national citizenship. Id. He then said that the idea of republican government implies a
right of citizens to consult on public affairs. Id. Thus, Waite, in context, distinguished the First
Amendment right that applied only against federal interference from a subset that applied to the
states because they were derived from the structure of government.
134. Field and Clifford dissented without opinion in Walker, 92 U.S. 90, 93 (1876). and Justice Clif-
ford "dissented" in Cruikshank where he argued that the indictment was defective for failure to spec-
ify the privilege impaired, and did not get into the issue of whether Congress had power, 92 U.S. at
565-66o. Since Clifford was the author of Edwards, it seems unlikely that his dissent with Fields in
Walker related to the incorporation point. Field and Clifford were the only dissenters in Strauder v.
West Virginia, ioo U.S. 303,312 (I88o), which struck down racial exclusion from jury service. This sug-
gests that the motivation for the dissents was hostility to the state civil rights statute on which Walker
was based. See Wildenthal, supra note 8, at I 142.
135. 92 U.S. at 542.
136. In a note to Justice Miller, Chief Justice Waite wrote:
I thank you very much for calling my attention to my omission to refer to the Slaughter
House cases. I am so little accustomed to citing cases as authority, except when I quote, that
I too often omit it when I should not. It will give me pleasure to make the notation, which is
certainly due.... I am glad the opinion meets your approbation.
Waite Papers, quoted in 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, PART Two, 273-74 n.153 (The Oliver Wendell Holmes De-
vise, Macmillan 1987) [hereinafter 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT].
137. Palmer, supra note 8, at 762-69.
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the case.'18 Palmer noted that Slaughter-House dissenters Swayne, Brad-
ley and Field, also chose not to dissent from Waite's opinion.'39 But, in
acquiescing to a holding on failure to allege state action, they could
scarcely be expected to take issue with whether Waite correctly analyzed
an opinion with which they disagreed. It was Justice Miller and the other
members of the Slaughter-House majority who would be expected to
speak up. Indeed, we know that Miller did speak up-to urge Waite to
cite Slaughter-House and to give Waite's opinion his approbation.'4"
Two years later, in Davidson v. New Orleans,4 ' Justice Miller noted
that the Slaughter-House Cases were primarily concerned with the privi-
leges and immunities clause, and not due process. Counsel in Davidson
pressed due process incorporation of the takings clause, but Miller re-
jected it. Miller also joined in Justice Woods's opinion in Presser v. Illi-
nois,"'42 which cited Cruikshank for the proposition that the right to bear
arms applied only against the federal government and that the right
peaceably to assemble was not a privilege of national citizenship except
when petitioning the government.'43 Thus, in every decision after the
Slaughter-House Cases, the Court interpreted that decision to establish a
framework for analysis that rejected incorporation through the privileges
and immunities clause, and Justice Miller joined these opinions.
At the turn of the century in i900, Slaughter-House was still the
leading case on privileges and immunities, and the Court understood it to
deny incorporation. In Maxwell v. Dow,'" the defendant complained that
his prosecution had been initiated by information instead of a grand jury
indictment and that the state jury that convicted him had only eight
members and was not the jury required by the Constitution.' Justice
Rufus Peckham said that this would have violated the constitutional
guarantees if done by the federal government, but the rights were not
privileges or immunities of national citizenship applicable against the
states.' 46 He quoted extensively from the dual citizenship portion of the
Slaughter-House opinion. After quoting Miller's list of privileges and
immunities of national citizenship, Peckham said: "A right, such as is
138. Id. at 769.
139. Id.
140. See FAIRMAN, supra note 136 and accompanying text.
141. 96 U.S. 97 (1878).
142. ii6 U.S. 252 (1886).
143. i6 U.S. at 265-69.
144. 176 U.S. 58i, 6o6 (i9oo).
145. Id. at 582.
146. Id. at 584-85.
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claimed here, was not mentioned, and we may suppose it was regarded as
pertaining to the State and not covered by the amendment.'
' 47
Granting the importance of the jury and the grand jury indictment,
Peckham said these were issues for the state alone:
But, as said in the Slaughter-House Cases, the protection of the citizen
in his rights as a citizen of the State still remains with the State. This
principle is again announced in the decision in United States v. Cruik-
shank, wherein it is said that sovereignty, for the protection of the
rights of life and personal liberty within the respective States, rests
alone with the States. But if all these rights are included in the phrase
"privileges and immunities" of citizens of the United States, which the
States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot in any manner
abridge, then the sovereignty of the State in regard to them has been
entirely destroyed, and the Slaughter-House Cases and United States v.
Cruikshank are all wrong, and should be overruled.
8
In Twining v. New Jersey,49 Justice Moody focused analysis on the
due process clause. 5 ' As in the previous cases, he understood the rights
stated in the Bill of Rights to be fundamental rights of citizens rather
than rights arising out of the Constitution, and fundamental rights were
not privileges or immunities of national citizenship:
If then it be assumed, without deciding the point, that an exemption
from compulsory self-incrimination is what is described as a fundamen-
tal right belonging to all who live under a free government, and inca-
pable of impairment by legislation or judicial decision, it is, so far as
the States are concerned, a fundamental right inherent in state citizen-
ship, and is a privilege or immunity of that citizenship only. Privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States, on the other hand, are
only such as arise out of the nature and essential character of the Na-
tional Government, or are specifically granted or secured to all citizens
or persons by the Constitution of the United States."'
Throughout the twentieth century, scholars and the Court continued
to read Miller's opinion in Slaughter-House as a rejection of the incorpo-
ration theory. The Court has proceeded to use the due process clause to
incorporate the Bill of Rights, while scholars carp that it should have
been looking at privileges and immunities instead.5 '
147. Id. at 591.
148. Id. at 593 (citation omitted).
149. 211 U.S. 78 (19o8).
150. Id. at io6-I4.
I51. Id. at 97.
152. Aynes, supra note 68, at 653-55; Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1, 71 n.249 (1996).
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C. THE FUNCTION OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE AS A
BASIS FOR CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT
Although critics complain that the status quo interpretation makes
the clause useless,'53 the congressional power to enforce privileges or
immunities transforms it. The grant of power in Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment to enforce the other provisions of the article was
very important to the drafters.'54 Opponents of the Fugitive Slave Law
had argued that Congress lacked power to legislate outside of the grants
of legislative power in Article I, and therefore it could not protect rights
based on other provisions of the Constitution.' As Professor Aynes has
demonstrated, Representative John Bingham shared the antislavery view
that Congress lacked power to enforce provisions of the Constitution
where there was no express grant of power.' 6 The privileges and immuni-
ties clause of Article IV was such a provision, and a number of the sup-
porters of the Fourteenth Amendment strongly supported empowering
Congress to enforce it.' 7 Section 5 was also useful to support enforce-
ment of the other clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and to ensure
constitutional power existed to enact the provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of I866.' Even if Section i had no effect on the scope or content of
existing privileges, it operated in tandem with Section 5 to grant Con-
gress express power to enforce them. Thus, a clear grant of congressional
power to enforce existing constitutional rights was neither a bad nor a
useless thing."'
153. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 476 (2d ed. 2002);
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 1303; CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF
FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED 76 (1997); Legislative Reference Service, Library of
Congress, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, S. Doc. No. 82-170, at 965 (Edward
S. Corwin eds., 1953); 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 1'19 (1953).
154. See supra notes 27, 28, 153.
155. See Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 305, 342 (1988).
156. Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE
L. J. 57, 74-78 (1993).
157. See supra note 27.
158. Bingham had opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on the grounds that it was unconstitu-
tional. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1290-93 (1866). One of his reasons for proposing the Four-
teenth Amendment was to assure federal power to enact such a law, and many other supporters of the
Amendment commented that it would constitutionalize the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. at 129o-96. It
was never necessary to consider the idea of a retroactive constitutionalization because the Civil Rights
Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 1i4, 16 Stat. I40, expressly reenacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, though
section 16 of the act extended the rights in Section I of that act to "all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States." Civil Rights Act, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
559. Decades earlier, Chief Justice Marshall had argued that a constitutional provision might sim-
ply make an implied power an express one when he discussed the meaning of "necessary" in
McCulloch v. Maryland,: "If no other motive for its insertion can be suggested, a sufficient one is
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Critics point out that the Court had already upheld congressional
power to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,' de-
spite the views of the antislavery activists, so there was no need for Sec-
tion 5 to assure Congressional power to enforce the Amendment.
16
,
However, Prigg left open whether Congress could exercise control over
state officers and agencies to make them follow constitutional mandates.
Kentucky v. Denison, 6, in which Justice Taney refused to order the Gov-
ernor of Ohio to deliver a fugitive, could be used to argue that it could
not.' 6' Thus, Section 5 was quite useful to make it clear that Congress
could enact legislation directed against the states. Indeed, the Court has
found that laws passed pursuant to Section 5 can confer a private right of
action against the state that trumps state sovereign immunity, at least
when enforcing the equal protection clause of that Amendment.6 4
Professor William Rich has argued that congressional power to cre-
ate private actions against the state when it is enforcing the privileges
and immunities clause goes even farther than the Court has yet recog-
nized. 6 Justice Miller stated that privileges or immunities include those
that "owe their existence to the Federal government, its National charac-
ter, its Constitution or its laws. ' 66 Rich argues that, when Miller men-
tioned the "right to use navigable waters," Miller was referring to
congressional power under the commerce clause and more generally
congressional power under Article I, Section 8.167 Thus, Rich argues that
rights derived from the statutes of the United States are privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.168
Professor Rich notes that, for purposes of analyzing congressional
power to create personal rights to sue a state for violating a federal stat-
ute, the Court distinguishes between those laws based on federal power
found in the desire to remove all doubts respecting the right to legislate on that vast mass of incidental
powers which must be involved in the constitution, if that instrument be not a splendid bauble." 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420-21 (I819).
I6o. 41 U.S. (t6 Pet.) 539,623 (1842).
I6I. 6 FAIRMAN, supra note 77, at 1276.
162. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 9 ° (1858).
163. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 250 (2d. ed., Liberty Funds 1997) (1977); Laurent H. Franz, Congressional Power to En-
force the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L. J. 1353, 1357 (1964); Aynes, On Mis-
reading, supra note 156, at 77-78.
164. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
364 (2ooi); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977 (2003).
165. See, e.g., Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" Seriously, supra note 6 at 230-32.
166. Id. at 174 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,78 (1872)).
167. Id. at 182.
168. See Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" Seriously, supra note 6, at 182, 195-96; see also
DAVID S. BOGEN, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU-
TION 123-24 (2003).
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prior to the Fourteenth Amendment and laws passed pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment's Section 5. ' He argues that a law granting a
private remedy against a state for violation of federal law enforces a
privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States and therefore the
principle of sovereign immunity that applied prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment does not apply. 70 The slew of cases decided this past decade
denied Congress power to create private rights of action against states
because counsel failed to argue privileges or immunities enforcement! " '
If Rich is correct, the strongest argument for an incorporationist reading
of the Slaughter-House Cases disappears. Even if Section i created no
new rights, it would serve the function of providing a basis for federal
legislation that overcomes state sovereignty.
The Court's new federalism decisions on state sovereign immunity
may be questionable, but Rich does not directly attack them.'72 There is a
substantial argument that the Eleventh Amendment was directed at pre-
cluding private actions against a state when jurisdiction was founded on
diversity of citizenship rather than federal law.'73 The Court's extension
of a more general notion of sovereign immunity that applies even when
diversity does not attach is on shaky ground. "4 But if the Constitution did
not preclude Congress from creating private causes of action against
states prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the congressional power to
enforce the privileges or immunities clause as interpreted by the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases would not have added much. Thus, Rich does not chal-
lenge the premise that state sovereign immunity precluded federal
private causes of action for state violations of federal law prior to the
Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, he contends that the Fourteenth
Amendment worked a sea change, giving the federal government power
to override state sovereignty that it never previously possessed.'75
169. Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" Seriously, supra note 6, at 208.
170. Id. at 215-16.
171. Id. at 208.
172. Id.
173. See John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpreta-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1927-6o (1983); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a
Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1035-38 (1983).
174- See David L. Shapiro, Comment, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst
Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61, 70 (1984); John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create
Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1445-53 (1975); Lawrence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in
Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism,
89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 683-88 (1976).
175. See generally Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" Seriously, supra note 6.
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Unfortunately, the argument to give a new function to the status quo
reading of the privileges or immunities clause has both a technical weak-
ness and a political gap. Politically, it seems inconceivable that the Court
would abandon its new federalism views of state sovereign immunity
simply because counsel argues with a new clause."6 The new argument
does not reduce the friction created by permitting private citizens to con-
trol litigation against the state fisc. The Court is likely to accept it only if
its logic is inescapable. But, alas, the logic is not.
Congressional power to overcome state sovereign immunity is a
bootstrap construction. If the power to enact the underlying substantive
federal law comes from grants in the original Constitution, the "privilege
of federal law" protected against state abridgment in Section i is limited
by the principle of state sovereignty and does not include a private cause
of action.'77 Even though Congress can pass whatever law is "necessary
and proper" to carry into execution the powers stated in Article I, Sec-
tion 8, it cannot confer a private action against the state.' Private en-
forcement of rights is through the Ex parte Young'79 injunction of state
officers on the theory that the injunction is against a person and not
against the state.' If the individual had no fights against the state under
Section i of the Fourteenth Amendment, the "privilege" would not run
against the state. The Section 5 power to enforce the privilege may be
limited to enforcing the federal law and not extended to the creation of a
new right. Other portions of the Fourteenth Amendment (the equal pro-
tection and due process clauses) create rights in the individual against the
state. Even some privileges or immunities of United States citizenship
(like the right to travel) are fights of the individual against the state. The
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were emphatic in attempting to
make sure that Congress could deal with a state violation of limits im-
posed directly by the Constitution. Congressional enforcement under
Section 5 merely provides the specific procedures for enforcing an exist-
ing right against the State. Because a privilege based in the Constitution
can easily be distinguished from a privilege recognized by the Constitu-
176. A different clause may provide an excuse for a decision that reaches a result contrary to prior
cases, but only when the Court independently wants to reach that result due to changed circumstances
in society and on the court. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. i86, 218-37 (1962) (holding reapportionment
justiciable under equal protection challenge despite Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) I, 39-47
(1849), finding a challenge to the election process not justiciable under the guarantee of a republican
form of government).
I77. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (r996); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 7o6, 712
(I999).
178. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 72; Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
179. 209 U.S. 123 (i9O8).




tion that is based on statute, the Court can readily limit Section 5 power
to the former.
In the hands of a sympathetic court, Rich's ingenious argument
might suggest a way around the precedents. Ex parte Young is a bit of a
fiction anyway. Perhaps a court may one day be sympathetic-although
if the court were sympathetic to ending state immunity it would be more
likely to simply overrule the earlier cases. For the near future, the Court
won't want to abandon the line of cases it has just decided-and the
bootstrap logic of Section 5 enforcement will not force it to surrender.
As long as the Court adheres to precedent, the privileges or immuni-
ties clause refers only to rights whose source lies elsewhere. Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment makes explicit that Congress has power to
enforce the rights in Section I, but the Court would probably have found
that power implicit in the document anyway. Thus, the privileges or im-
munities clause serves no creative function in the document. The sterility
of this interpretation makes the Slaughter-House Cases a tempting target.
III. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE THREE: REVISIONIST ARGUMENTS THAT THE
SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES SUPPORT INCORPORATION OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS
While there have always been individuals who read Justice Miller's
opinion to support incorporation,'"' the position has attracted its greatest
support in recent years. Professor Robert Palmer argued that the lan-
guage of the opinion supports incorporation, and that the idea was repu-
diated only later in Cruikshank.182 Kevin Newsom argued that
incorporation was consistent with Miller's philosophy and with his posi-
tion in subsequent cases. 8' Finally, Professor Bryan Wildenthal built on
Newsom and Palmer, using the views of democratic congressmen imme-
diately after the decision to support the incorporationist reading.'
84
A. THE LANGUAGE OF THE OPINION
Professor Robert Palmer claimed Justice Miller intended to support
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, based primarily on the language
of Miller's opinion. 5' The linguistic argument alone, however, is incon-
clusive, and suffers from the necessity of treating the right simultane-
i8x. Professor Mark deWolfe Howe pointed out the potential for an incorporation reading of
Miller's opinion in the Constitutional Law class I attended forty years ago. John Hart Ely suggested it
as well in DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 196 n.59 (Harvard University Press 1980) (1938).
182. See Palmer, supra note 8, at 762-70.
183. Newsom, supra note 8, at 7o6-I2.
184. See Wildenthal, supra note 8, at 116-34.
185. Palmer, supra note 8, at 739-56.
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ously as concrete and abstract. The real crux of the argument is that
Miller must have intended the clause in the Constitution to have an ef-
fect, and incorporation is the only interpretation that would change the
law without implicating fundamental rights reasoning. However, whether
Miller intended the clause to have an impact or to be redundant is the
basic question.
Palmer contended that Miller's list of privileges and immunities of
national citizenship responded to the claim that his opinion had nullified
the privileges or immunities clause.' 86 The supremacy clause of Article VI
already precluded states from abridging any privilege of federal citizen-
ship. 8, Palmer argued that Miller needed to interpret the clause to incor-
porate the Bill of Rights to give it meaning. However, Miller's mention
of numerous rights (interstate travel, protection abroad, commerce and
navigation, treaty rights, and rights under the Civil War amendments)
unaffected by an express prohibition on state abridgment undermines the
argument that his list's purpose was to show that Section i of the
amendment changed the status quo.
Miller wrote in the Slaughter-House Cases headnotes that the clause
placed privileges and immunities under congressional protection, and he
indicated in Bradwell v. Illinois'88 that the Fourteenth Amendment trans-
ferred powers to the Federal government when he said that the right to
regulate the license to practice law was "one of those powers which are
not transferred for its protection to the Federal government.""' Palmer
relied on these comments to argue that Miller supported incorporation."9
186. Id. at 748.
187. For example, Miller said the protection of the federal government while in foreign lands was a
privilege of citizens of the United States. With no jurisdiction or presence in foreign lands, States could
do nothing that would abridge that privilege. Id. Consequently, the inability of the state to interfere
with a privilege unless it was directly applicable to the state does not show that Miller intended the
rights he mentioned to apply to the states. This undercuts Palmer's contention that Miller must have
mentioned habeas as part of a theory of incorporation because the clause would only affect habeas if it
applied to habeas issued by state courts. Id. at 749-50. Further, the state could interfere with habeas
either by blocking access to federal courts or by refusing to honor habeas for prisoners in state cus-
tody. Congress had extended the federal writ in 1867 to apply broadly to persons in state custody. Ju-
diciary Act, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385-86 (1867). The writ had previously been extended to some
particular situations of state imprisonment that threatened federal interests, but the new constitutional
protections of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment made federal processes for enforcement of
constitutional rights in states even more critical. See Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension
Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REv.
862, 868 (1994). This statutory extension of the constitutional guarantee did not need the doctrine of
incorporation to be binding on the states. As a federal right, the writ was a privilege of national citi-
zenship. Rejection of the writ by a state court would therefore abridge a privilege of citizens of the
United States.
188. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
189. Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 139. Palmer, supra note 8, at 752.
19o. Palmer, supra note 8, at 752-53.
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But Miller's statements are wholly consistent with the declaratory status
quo interpretation. The Amendment made explicit what had only been
implicit: It located the privileges and immunities within Congressional
power to enforce. It was Section 5, not the privileges in Section i that
was new. Further, the Fourteenth Amendment gave the federal govern-
ment power to enforce due process and equal protection. Both were
transferred from being wholly matters of state law into a matter of fed-
eral concern. Miller's Bradwell remark could refer to those rights; thus, it
does not suggest that he thought the Bill of Rights was incorporated. 1' In
short, there is no affirmative statement from Justice Miller that federal
powers were expanded by the privileges and immunities clause in Section
I of the Fourteenth Amendment, and nothing remotely resembling ex-
press support for incorporation.
Palmer's argument amounts to asserting the incorporation reading
and insisting that Miller meant to give the privileges and immunities
clause independent content beyond making express what was already
implicit.'92 That assumption is the crux of his argument, and it assumes
what the argument is supposed to prove.
Justice Miller did not say that he was describing the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States in order to show that the
amendment effectuated a change.'93 He did not say that the clause cre-
ated new privileges or gave them any new operation.'94 He was insistent
that the privileges or immunities clause did not apply to fundamental
rights, which was the only mode of interpretation that had previously
been understood to work incorporation.'95 Most of the privileges he men-
tioned could not have been affected by the clause. Their listing makes
sense only if its purpose was to demonstrate that the category of privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States is not an empty one.
Miller said that was exactly what he was doing: "lest it should be said that
no such privileges and immunities are to be found if those we have been
considering are excluded.""'
Miller repudiated the idea that the fundamental rights of citizens
were privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States except for
"the very few express limitations which the Federal Constitution im-
191. Further, saying that one power was not transferred for its protection to the federal govern-
ment does not assert that other powers have been transferred. It is somewhat strange, in any event, to
consider restrictions on government as "powers."
192. See Palmer, supra note 8.
193. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (i6 Wall.) 36 (1872).
194. See id.
195. See, e.g., id. at 6o.
196. Id. at 79.
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posed upon the [s]tates"'97 before the Amendment was adopted. The in-
corporation interpretation of his opinion asserts that he believed limita-
tions on the federal government that were never expressly imposed on
the states were "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States"
as abstract general rights, not just as the concrete right specified in the
document. But the tenor of the opinion seems opposed to a definition of
privileges of citizens of the United States that includes abstract general
principles applicable to any government. He referred to privileges
"which owe their existence" to the Constitution, but the right to assem-
bly was a preexisting natural right. The Constitution only created a privi-
lege against federal interference with that right.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment expressly prohibits states
from denying due process or equal protection, rights that did not previ-
ously apply against the states, that does not mean that the amendment
altered the meaning or effect of privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States, rights that always applied against the states. Miller's lan-
guage cautions against interpreting his opinion to produce radical
change:
[W]e do not see in those amendments any purpose to destroy the main
features of the general system. Under the pressure of all the excited
feeling growing out of the war, our statesmen have still believed that
the existence of the States with powers for domestic and local govern-
ment, including the regulation of civil rights the rights of person and of
property was essential to the perfect working of our complex form of
government, though they have thought proper to impose additional
limitations on the States, and to confer additional power on that of the
Nation.'
98
Palmer pointed out the potential to interpret Miller's opinion to
support incorporation, but his argument that it was Miller's intent rested
on an unproved assumption. It did little to undermine the conventional
wisdom that Miller's failure to expressly adopt incorporation, and his ac-
quiescence in later decisions denying incorporation, showed that he
meant in Slaughter-House that the privileges and immunities clause was a
declaration of the status quo.
B. JUSTICE MILLER'S PHILOSOPHY
Kevin Newsom took the incorporationist reading two steps beyond
Palmer in an article in the Yale Law Journal. He argued that incorpora-
tion was the proper reading of the ambiguous language in the opinion
because it was consistent with Miller's basic philosophy and, more impor-
197. Id. at 77.
198. Id. at 82.
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tantly, with his pattern of votes in other Reconstruction era cases."' Like
Palmer, Newsom read the ambiguity in the opinion as more likely to im-
ply incorporation." His article then was primarily an attempt to support
the incorporationist reading by showing that it is plausible in context.
Newsom said that the key elements of Miller's philosophy were "(i
respect for the federal-state balance, (2) deference to original intent, (3)
concern for the overburdening of the federal courts, and (4) disdain for
laissez-faire constitutional theory."'. Except for original intent, these
elements of Miller's philosophy not only supported his rejection of fun-
damental rights, but they supported a rejection of incorporation. The
conventional view that Miller's opinion denuded the privileges and im-
munities clause of any independent force would have preserved the pre-
existing federal-state balance, taken the courts out of the business of
striking laws down, restrained growth in federal litigation, and avoided
laissez-faire constitutionalism. Incorporation shifts the balance further
toward the federal government, leads to invalidations of law by the court,
and interposes the court in more litigation. Thus, the philosophical ar-
gument largely cuts against incorporation. The only conflict that Newsom
identified between Justice Miller's philosophy and the status quo reading
of his opinion was his respect for the original intent of the framers.0" But
Miller's repudiation of fundamental rights meaning was just as contrary
to original intent as any view on incorporation.
There is no contemporaneous historical support whatsoever for the
proposition that the privileges and immunities clause was intended to
apply only to rights expressly protected against the federal government
in the original Constitution and not to any other rights deemed funda-
mental. Representative Bingham and Senator Howard were the only
members of Congress who explicitly said that the Bill of Rights was made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment during the de-
bates on the amendment. Howard's statement of the meaning of privi-
leges or immunities when presenting the clause to the Senate included
the fundamental rights recital of Bushrod Washington in Corfield v.
Coryell, which Miller expressly excluded from the definition of privileges
of national citizenship.
Representative Bingham's references to the Bill of Rights during the
debates were ambiguous because he believed that the privileges and im-
munities of Article IV included all the rights in the first eight Amend-
199. Newsom, supra note 8, at 687.
200. Id. at 649.
201. Id. at 707.
202. Id. at 696-703.
203. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
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ments °4 He seemed to distinguish between a generalized bill of rights-
the "privileges and immunities" of Article IV-and the specific Bill of
Rights of the original articles of amendment. Thus, he spoke of "the pro-
visions in the bill of rights, that the citizens of the United States shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States in the several States, and that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without the due process of law," and "the bill of
rights that all shall be protected alike in life, liberty, and property." ' 5 He
was clear that his proposed amendment gave the federal government
power to enforce "the bill of rights under the articles of amendment to
the Constitution, '2. because he understood the privileges and immunities
in Article IV included all the rights important in the relationship of a
citizen to the state, including equal protection.
Bingham's most explicit statements about the incorporation of the
Bill of Rights came with reference to an earlier form of the amendment,
a form that tracked the language of Article IV and spoke of the "privi-
leges and immunities of citizens in the several states" rather than the
later language of "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States."2" However, Justice Miller in the Slaughter-House Cases2s seized
on the difference between the privileges specified in Article IV and the
new language of privileges of citizens "of the United States" in the Four-
teenth Amendment to distinguish the two concepts.2"
After the current language of the Fourteenth Amendment was in-
troduced, no one during the debate in the House of Representatives on
its adoption made a clear statement that it incorporated any of the Bill of
Rights against the states, although Bingham came close when he said that
imposition of cruel and unusual punishment by a state "contrary to the
express letter of your Constitution" was a problem that the amendment
would remedy."' But Bingham's cruel and unusual example was punish-
204. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. io89 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
205. Id. at 1094-95.
206. Id. at io89.
207. Id.
2o8. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
209. See id. at 75.
210. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham). Four years af-
ter the amendment, Bingham said that he changed the form of the amendment from his first proposal
to make it clear that it incorporated the Bill of Rights. "Is it not clear that other and different privi-
leges and immunities than those to which a citizen of a state was entitled are secured by the provision
of the fourteenth article, that no state shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, which are defined in the eight articles of amendment." CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., Ist
Sess. 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham). But he did not articulate this distinction between the
privileges of citizens of a state and of the United States during the adoption debates, and instead re-
ferred sweepingly throughout to the privileges in the Fourteenth Amendment as based on the privi-
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ment by confederate states for refusing to renounce allegiance to the Un-
ion. He went on to say that "the right to bear true allegiance to the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States, and to be protected in life, liberty
and property""'. were Article IV privileges of citizens that needed protec-
tion by the explicit grant of power to Congress that was in the Four-
teenth Amendment."' Virtually everyone else who spoke on the
privileges and immunities clause also identified them with the fundamen-
tal rights of Article IV.213 Yet Miller very specifically repudiated any un-
derstanding that the privileges of Article IV were the same as the
privileges in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Newsom pointed to a trip Justice Miller took with Representative
Bingham prior to the decision as further support for reading the case as
incorporating,"4 but this seems to be guilt by close association. The basis
for any sound historical argument that the privileges and immunities
clause incorporated the Bill of Rights is that they were fundamental
rights of citizenship like the rights to contract and property."5 Justice
Miller repudiated the fundamental rights reading of the clause. Thus, his
supposed fidelity to original intent did not prevent him from ignoring
these statements of the framers.
There were, however, some statements by participants in the adop-
tion process that lent support to rejecting incorporation. Maryland Sena-
tor Reverdy Johnson famously objected to the privileges and immunities
clause: "I do not understand what will be the effect of that..' ' .. Miller
would also be aware of Senator Lyman Trumbull's statement in the de-
bates over a civil rights statute in 1871 that the Fourteenth Amendment
merely repeated the language of Article IV and added nothing to it:
The protection which the Government affords to American citizens
under the Constitution as it was originally formed is precisely the pro-
tection it affords to American citizens under the Constitution as it now
exists. The fourteenth amendment has not extended the rights and
privileges of citizenship one iota.... National citizenship is one thing,
and State citizenship another; and before this constitutional amend-
ment was adopted the same obligation, in my judgment, rested upon
the Government of the United States to protect citizens of the United
States as now. 17
leges in Article IV. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. io89, 1094-95, 2542 (I866) (statement of Rep.
Bingham).
211. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., Ist Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
212. Id.
213. Supra note 28.
214. Newsom, supra note 8, at 700.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 25-32.
216. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 3041 (1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson).
217. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., ist Sess. 576-77 (1871) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
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Thus, Miller's philosophy of original intent would not preclude him
from taking the view that Bingham first articulated: the privileges and
immunities clause would only enable Congress to enact laws to enforce
those rights which already existed against the states. The difference was
that Justice Miller understood full well, contrary to the position of Bing-
ham and others in Congress, that there was no previous right against any
state to any of the protections of the Bill of Rights. The Amendment was
built on a faulty premise, and honoring the intent of the framers did not
require Miller to ignore what they said.
C. JUSTICE MILLER'S VOTES IN SUBSEQUENT CASES
Newsom claimed that Miller's position in subsequent cases was con-
sistent with a belief in incorporation of the Bill of Rights.215 This is sig-
nificant because Miller's acquiescence in the Court's repudiation of
incorporation is a major reason for believing that he abjured incorpora-
tion in Slaughter-House.19 Newsom argued that no subsequent case
forced Miller or the Court during Miller's tenure to discuss specifically
whether the first eight Amendments were incorporated.22° Either the dis-
cussion on incorporation was dicta, counsel failed to rely on the Four-
teenth Amendment as incorporating earlier guarantees, or counsel
sought to use another clause of that amendment. Cruikshank involved a
failure to allege the state action necessary to find a violation of the
Amendment"; counsel attempted to apply the Bill of Rights directly
without referring to the Fourteenth Amendment in Twitchell;... and the
rejection of incorporation in the Hurtado"3 case was based entirely on the
due process clause.2 4
Newsom was technically correct that the Court did not have to face
an issue of privileges and immunities incorporation in any of these deci-
sions, though it is hard to shake the impression that the tenor of the deci-
sions opposed it. For example, Presser,"' which Newsom does not
mention, stated that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states
without mentioning any Fourteenth Amendment argument. , 6 But Justice
218. Newsom, supra note 8, at 706-33.
219. See generally Aynes, supra note 68, at 653-55.
220. Newsom, supra note 8, at 7o6-33.
221. 92 U.S. 542, 549 (1876).
222. Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321, 324-27 (1869). The same was true in Eilen-
becker v. Dist. Ct. of Plymouth County, 134 U.S. 31 (189o), a decision that Miller himself wrote. There
he rejected claims under the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments on the grounds that those amend-
ments applied only to the federal government. Id.
223. Hurtado v. California, ttO U.S. 516 (1884).
224. Newsom, supra note 8, at 712-26.
225. Presser v. Illinois, tm6 U.S. 252 (i886).
226. Id. at 265.
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Woods cited the passage from Cruikshank that asserts the right was not
created by the amendment but only protected from interference by Con-
gress.227 Justice Woods then examined the Fourteenth Amendment privi-
leges and immunities clause to determine whether it was violated, but he
did not back reference the right to bear arms. Technically, this much of
the opinion was consistent with not directly facing the incorporation is-
sue, but it is hard to believe that its author believed that the privileges
and immunities clause made the Second Amendment applicable to the
states.
Justice Woods said the First Amendment right to petition and as-
semble was the only clause in the Constitution that could have any rela-
tionship to associating with others. According to Woods, Cruikshank said
the right was one of national citizenship, but the right to assemble was
not protected by the clause unless the assembly was for national pur-
poses." 9 That mis-described Cruikshank, which did not interpret the right
of assembly so narrowly, and found the privilege of assembling to discuss
national issues arose from the nature of the national government rather
than from the First Amendment clause. 3' But Woods understood it was
the national purposes, not the First Amendment, that made the assembly
a privilege of national citizenship:
It cannot be successfully questioned that the State governments, unless
restrained by their own Constitutions, have the power to regulate or
prohibit associations and meetings of the people, except in the case of
peaceable assemblies to perform the duties or exercise the privileges of
citizens of the United States." '
The civil jury decisions pose the greatest problem for Newsom's ar-
gument, because the Court expressly stated that the civil jury in state
court was not a Fourteenth Amendment privilege or immunity. Ed-
wards3 ' was dicta, but Newsom conceded that Miller seemed to join
other members of the court in saying that the right to a jury in civil cases
was not applicable to the states. 33 Newsom argued that the original un-
227. Id. at 266-67.
228. Id. at 265-66.
229. Id. at 264-66.
230. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). Newsom points out that Woods had sup-
ported incorporation in his opinion as a federal circuit judge in United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 82
(S.D. Ala. 1871). Newsom, supra note 8, at 726. Woods and Bradley issued an early opinion in the
Slaughter-House Case on circuit giving a fundamental rights reading to the privileges and immunities
clause. Newsom's suggestion that Woods supported incorporation after his elevation to the Supreme
Court, however, seems to fly in the face of Woods' treatment of the Second Amendment in Presser
and his vote in Hurtado against incorporation through the due process clause.
231. Presser, 116 U.S. at 267.
232. Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (1874).
233. Newsom, supra note 8, at 728.
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derstanding of the Fourteenth Amendment did not include the right to a
civil jury trial -it concerned federalism rather than individual rights since
it protected the jury in diversity cases, it was not listed by Senator How-
ard, and several states that ratified the amendment had provisions incon-
sistent with its incorporation. 34 Even Justice Bradley concurred in both
Edwards35 and Walker v. Sauvinet.3' Newsom distinguished Miller's join-
ing Waite's opinion in Walker, which expressly states that civil trial by
jury is not a privilege or immunity of federal citizenship, as a sui generis
matter because of Miller's aversion to the jury.237
Newsom's case analysis precludes reading Miller as applying every
provision of the Bill of Rights to the states. Thus, even Newsom ulti-
mately denies the total incorporation theory.231 In the final analysis,
Newsom offered a good case to show that the decisions of the court on
the privileges and immunities clause were poorly considered and, other
than with respect to the civil jury, the holdings did not technically deny
incorporation. But all his originality and skill fail to make a persuasive
case that Miller supported incorporation-rejection is more consistent
with Miller's votes in subsequent cases and everything else he said. '39
234. Newsom, supra note 8, at 729-3 o . Newsom cites Amar for the federalism point. Id. at 729
n.418 (citing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 89 (1998)). Pro-
fessor Stanton Knauss has criticized Amar's federalism argument, but his suggestion might also be
used to distinguish jury trial from other amendments for incorporation purposes. Knauss contended
that the jury trial amendment essentially delegated power to Congress to determine which cases
should be tried by a jury-a delegation notion that would not be readily transferred to the state level.
See Stanton D. Knauss, The Original Understanding of the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 33
U. RICH. L. REV. 407 (1999).
235. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (1874).
236. 92 U.S. 9° (1875).
237. Newsom, supra note 8, at 730-32.
238. Bryan Wildenthal analyzed Newsom's discussion of the cases in some detail. Although Wil-
denthal agreed with Newsom's incorporationist view of Slaughter-House, he disagreed with Newsom's
interpretation of the later cases. Wildenthal, supra note 8, at lO65--66. Wildenthal said that the civil
jury was not "uniquely unsusceptible to incorporation." Id. at 1147 (see discussion at 1144-46). He
observed that the decisions between 1874 and 1876 backed away from incorporation. He examined
Edwards and Walker, noting the defects in argument but disagreeing with Newsom on their signifi-
cance. He then did the same with Cruikshank, pointing out that counsel did not make incorporation an
issue in that case and in fact favored it. Nevertheless, his analysis of Waite's opinion showed Newsom's
missteps and the clear anti-incorporationist structure of the opinion. Id. at 1 148-61. He concluded that
incorporation had lost before the 1877 Compromise, but by inattention and neglect rather than as a
fully debated concept. Id. at 1161-69.
239. Professor Aynes also notes that Justice Miller's I880 lectures did not give a hint of an incor-
poration reading of either the Slaughter-House Cases or the privileges or immunities clause, and in-
deed seemed to reject incorporation specifically with respect to the First Amendment's establishment
clause. Aynes, supra note 68, at 655. Miller said the federal government had "no right to raise money
by taxation for religious purposes, or for a thousand things on account of which States may impose
taxes and collect them of people." SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER, LECrURES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 104 (New York, Banks and Brothers 1893).
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D. THE CONGRESSIONAL DEMOCRATS' REACTION
Like Newsom and Palmer, Professor Bryan Wildenthal contended
that Miller's language makes more sense as supporting incorporation.
Much of his article and its sequel were designed to show that incorpora-
tion was the proper interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and
that contemporaries understood that to be true and continued to battle
for incorporation, despite the opinions of the majority.24" Wildenthal's
contentions with respect to Slaughter-House focused on the opinions in
the case 4' and its reception in Congress,242 where members of the De-
mocratic minority interpreted the opinion to support incorporation.
The Slaughter-House opinion frustrated congressional Republicans,
because of its effect on the debate over a proposed bill to prohibit dis-
crimination in public accommodations. Democratic representative James
Beck of Kentucky quickly asserted that the Slaughter-House Cases deci-
sion denied Congress power over the subject. 43 Discussion of the case fo-
cused on its impact on the bill and forced the bill's supporters to shift
their rationale to the equal protection clause and to debate state action
concerns.
Some congressmen, of course, did not understand the case. Con-
gressman John T. Harris of Virginia said that the majority and the minor-
ity concurred in the definition of privileges and immunities of a citizen of
the United States "that they mean 'the fundamental rights of life, liberty,
and property."'" But most members understood that the Slaughter-
House Cases repudiated a fundamental rights view and that a constitu-
tional basis for the new Civil Rights Act would have to be found else-
where.45 Whether Miller intended incorporation of the Bill of Rights was
irrelevant, because the proposed legislation did not deal with any of
those rights.
Nevertheless, some Democratic opponents of the bill asserted an in-
corporationist reading of the privileges and immunities clause after
Slaughter-House. Thus, not only was the language capable of being read
as supporting incorporation, but several contemporary politicians read it
that way. They at least saw the ambiguity in Miller's opinion and used it
240. Wildenthal, supra note 8; Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the Disincorporation
of the Bill of Rights, 6I OHIO ST. L.J. 1457 (20o0).
241. Other than the statements of democratic representatives, Wildenthal's arguments for an in-
corporationist reading of the majority opinion have already been discussed. See supra note 39 discuss-
ing his argument on the views of counsel, and notes 99 and io8 pointing to weaknesses in the analysis
of the dissents.
242. Wildenthal, supra note 8, at I i 16-25.
243. CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., Ist Sess. 342 (1873) (Statement of Sen. Beck).
244. CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., ist Sess. 376 (1874) (Statement of Rep. Harris).
245. See infra Part I.A.
[Vol. 55:333
SLAUGHTER-HOUSE FIVE
to press their argument that the rights in the bill were not protected.
Congressman Beck referred to the Bill of Rights as privileges and immu-
nities from Slaughter-House46 Representative Roger Mills of Texas dis-
tinguished rights granted by the state, such as property and jury service,
from fixed rights of citizens of the United States, which he said were fun-
damental. Thus, he said that the privileges are those recognized and
guaranteed in the Constitution -i.e., the Bill of Rights.47 Congressman
William Herndon of Tennessee also referred to the privileges or immuni-
ties clause as including rights of free speech and jury trial. 48 Finally,
Senator Thomas Norwood of Georgia said that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not grant any new privileges, but it made the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights applicable to the states. 49 Wildenthal points out that the
incorporationist views of the Slaughter-House Cases voiced in Congress
were not contradicted, and he suggests they are "entitled to substantial
weight in any assessment of the contemporary understanding of Slaugh-
ter-House."5'
These congressional remarks are not convincing evidence of the
meaning of the majority opinion in Slaughter-House. The only members
of Congress who expressly took the incorporation reading were southern
Democrats opposed to the proposed civil rights laws. And even they
showed some confusion. For example, Representative Mills said "these
privileges are, among others, the right to the enjoyment of life, liberty,
property, and the pursuit of happiness," before he continued with the
specifications from the amendments.5 ' Republicans neither expressly re-
pudiated nor supported the incorporationist interpretation of the clause
after the Slaughter-House Cases. They were more concerned with com-
plaining about the decision or stressing its racial focus for equal protec-
tion.
Incorporation theory had two advantages for Democratic congress-
men opposed to the Civil Rights proposals. It gave a substantive meaning
to the Fourteenth Amendment that might protect white men resisting
Reconstruction legislatures, and it denied any support from the clause
for federal measures relevant to protecting against racial discrimination.
Thus, the Democrats' interpretation of Miller's opinion was politically
246. CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1873) (statement of Rep. Mills).
247. CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., Ist Sess. 384-85 (1874) (statement of Rep. Mills).
248. CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., ist Sess. 420 (1874) (statement of Rep. Herndon).
249. CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., Ist Sess. 242 (1874).
250. Wildenthal, supra note 8, at 1 125.
251. CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., ist Sess. 384-85 (1874) (statement of Rep. Mills).
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desirable as well as linguistically possible.25 ' It was not, however, an accu-
rate perception of the opinion itself.
E. THE FAILURE OF REVISIONIST THEORIES
The Slaughter-House revisionists have three legitimate arguments.
First, the language of Miller's opinion is open to an incorporationist in-
terpretation, even though it requires apparently inconsistent steps of rea-
soning to do so. Second, some Democratic members of Congress read
the opinion that way. Third, the status quo reading makes the clause re-
dundant.
The purported consistency of the opinion with Miller's philosophy,
his votes in other cases, and the statements of the dissenters do not sup-
port the revisionist case. Incorporation would have increased the load on
federal courts to Miller's dismay. Miller and his colleagues rejected in-
corporation with fairly clear language within a short period of time. Fi-
nally, Slaughter-House dissenters stated that Miller's opinion made the
amendment futile, and his failure to respond to them with an explicit
statement of incorporation indicates that they were right.
In short, the case of the revisionists depends on heavily discounting
the subsequent decisions of the court which Justice Miller joined, or as-
suming a sudden and otherwise inexplicable about face on a matter of
basic principle. Miller's language in Slaughter-House may have been
slightly ambiguous, but a declaratory status quo interpretation is the
most natural understanding. The incorporation understanding of several
Democratic congressmen seems motivated by their desire to limit federal
power to protect African Americans while securing protections for them-
selves against Reconstruction governments. Although the most coherent
incorporation theory hinges on believing that the clause embodies fun-
damental rights, Justice Miller's repudiation of a "fundamental rights"
interpretation was the basis for the opinion. Because the opinion itself
gave every indication that Miller did not regard the privileges and immu-
nities clause as resulting in any change and the tautology of the status
quo analysis did not deter the Court from plainly adopting it within a few
years, avoiding a tautological interpretation fulfills the reader's hope for
the opinion rather than proving the writer's intent. Even a status quo
252. It seems anomalous that former Supreme Court Justice John Campbell, who joined the Dred
Scott majority and resigned from the Court at the outset of the war, was the counsel for the butchers,
asserting the broadest view of the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Rich suggests that Campbell was
consistent-advocating private property rights and laissez faire economics whether through states
rights or privileges or immunities. Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" Seriously, supra note 6, at
179. This suggests that while Republicans sought the widest scope for congressional power, Democrats
looked to the court as a more reliable protector of their interests.
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reading serves the purpose of erasing any question of congressional
power to enforce preexisting rights. Finally, Justice Miller suggested us-
ing the Slaughter-House Cases as an appropriate cite for the discussion in
Cruikshank that effectively precluded incorporation, and he approved of
Waite's opinion in that case."3
The conventional wisdom is right: Miller fully intended to repudiate
any theory of incorporation when he repudiated a fundamental rights in-
terpretation of the privileges and immunities clause.
IV. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE FOUR: THE SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES
SHOULD BE OVERRULED
Justice Miller's critics argue that his repudiation of any form of fun-
damental rights content for the privileges or immunities clause, including
incorporation, ignored the history of the amendment and has had terrible
consequences for the development of Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence. Indeed, most commentators on the case today believe that Justice
Miller made a mistake and the decision should be overruled.54
Justice Miller had a wide variety of choices in interpreting the privi-
leges or immunities clause: he could have adopted Justice Black's incor-
poration theory (as the revisionists believe he did); he could have
pursued an equality analysis as Professor Nelson suggests Justice Field
may have done;255 or he might have accepted a natural law view of fun-
damental rights that would be likely to include the Bill of Rights as Jus-
tice Bradley chose. However, each choice had significant drawbacks then
and equally serious defects today.
A. THE DECISION Is HISTORICALLY INCORRECT
Fourteenth Amendment scholars agree that the framers intended
the privileges or immunities clause to be the centerpiece of Section 1.256
253. See FAIRMAN supra note 136.
254. Aynes, supra note 68, at 628; Thomas B. McAffee, Constitutional Interpretation-The Uses
and Limitations of Original Intent, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 275, 282-83 (1986); LEONARD W. LEVY, The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, in JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 64, 69 (i972); Louis LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? A COMMENTARY ON THE SUPREME COURT'S
POWER TO REVISE THE CONSTrrrUON 201 (1975).
255. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL
DOCTRINE 156-58 (1988).
256. See AMAR, supra note 234; BERGER, supra note 163; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 12-13 (1986) [hereinafter CURTIS, No
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE]; JOHN DENVIR, DEMOCRACY'S CONSTITUTION: CLAIMING THE PRIVILEGES OF
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 5-6 (2OO1); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS,
1863-1869, io6 (199o); NELSON, supra note 255; Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 5-139 (1949); John Har-
rison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, IOI YALE L. J. 1385, 1385-1474 (1992).
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The privileges and immunities clause, rather than due process, was to be
the source for substantive restrictions on state government. There seems
to be common ground among the critics that Miller was wrong because
the historic background of the privileges and immunities clause shows
that it should have been given a different substance. At this point, the
ground parts and we fall into the abyss of conflicting accounts for the
substance of the clause. Scholars disagree greatly about the content of
the privileges or immunities clause, particularly with respect to the in-
corporation of the first eight Amendments of the Constitution to apply
to the States.257
I. Privileges and Immunities Incorporated the Bill of Rights
Michael Curtis has written extensively to show that the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment intended to make the first eight Amend-
ments applicable to the States." Bingham and Howard said so expressly,
and incorporation is at least consistent with the remarks of many others
who contended that the privileges or immunities clause secured funda-
mental rights.
It may be debatable whether every one of the Bill of Rights was to
be incorporated against the States. Akhil Amar has suggested that only
those involving individual rights and not those concerned with federalism
should be applied."9 Charles Fairman contended that only those rights
fundamental to ordered liberty were included in the "fundamental
257. Michael Curtis and Richard Aynes contend that the privileges of citizens of the United States
include all of the Bill of Rights and apply them to the States-total incorporation. See CURTIS, supra
note 256; Aynes, supra note 156 at io3-o4; Richard L. Aynes, Refined Incorporation and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 33 U. RIcH. L. REV. 289, 289-312 (1999) [hereinafter Aynes, Refined Incorpora-
tion]. Akhil Amar distinguished individual rights from rights based in federalism, arguing that only
amendments creating the former were to be applied against the states. AMAR, supra note 234. Law-
rence Tribe and John Denvir have seen the clause as the source for a rich array of unenumerated
rights. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy, supra note 9, at Iio-98; DENVIt, supra note 256 at 5-Io. At the
other extreme, the late Raoul Berger argued vigorously for a limited application of the clause. See
BERGER, supra note 163.
258. Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Profes-
sor Berger, I6 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45 (i98o); Michael Kent Curtis, Further Adventures of the Nine
Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 89 (1982)
[hereinafter Curtis, Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat]; Michael Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 14 CONN. L. REV. 237 (1982) [hereinafter Curtis, The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights]; CuRTIs, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 228; Michael Kent
Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper's Book, The Impending Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and
Some Light on The Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1113 (1993) [hereinafter Curtis, The Impending Crisis]; Curtis, supra note 152; Michael Kent Curtis,
Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the
United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 17I (2000) [hereinafter Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life
After Death].
259. AMAR, supra note 234, at 215-30.
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rights" that other congressmen expected to be identified as privileges or
immunities.2'6 But the primary debate is not over whether the framers in-
tended any of the Bill of Rights to apply to the states through the privi-
leges or immunities clause, but how many. The historians' controversy is
largely the same as the Court's discussion today-whether total incorpo-
ration or selective incorporation -but legal historians would locate the
source of incorporation in the privileges or immunities clause rather than
the due process clause. Thus, Miller did not follow the framers' intention
when he rejected the fundamental rights version of the privileges or im-
munities clause, which would have resulted in incorporation.
If incorporation was intended, however, it was because the rights
stated in the Constitution were fundamental and not because they were
stated in the Constitution. Congress was concerned with the rights that
governments were established to protect, such as property and personal
safety, although congressmen might have thought the Bill of Rights in-
cluded because they are equally fundamental to the functioning of free
government. Nevertheless, the debates show that privileges or immunities
referred to fundamental rights that were universal in nature; it was not
simply a synonym for "those rights explicitly enumerated in the Constitu-
tion. ,,26,
Some form of incorporation is consistent with the statements of the
framers. However, limiting privileges and immunities to incorporating
the Bill of Rights lacks any historical support, precludes recognition of
unenumerated rights, and fastens on the states procedures that would not
have been acceptable at the time. It is an ahistorical interpretation that
fastens dumb rules on the states and excludes wise ones. Its adoption
would be a policy decision on the Court's role: attempting to balance fear
of judicial power with concern for vindication of important rights by con-
fining the power to the concrete language found elsewhere in the docu-
ment.
2. Privileges and Immunities Require Equality in Rights
The incorporation of the Bill of Rights, whether totally or selec-
tively, is not the only way to interpret the intention of the framers in
drafting the privileges or immunities clause. The phrase "privileges or
immunities" was used in the Fourteenth Amendment because it echoed
the existing language in Article IV. As Justice Miller pointed out, Article
IV did not create fundamental rights, but simply required a state to grant
to citizens of other states those fundamental rights that it granted its
26o. Fairman, supra note 256, at 5-139.
261. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
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own. 625 The citizen of another state was entitled to the same contract and
property rights the state afforded its own citizens, but also to the same
rights of free speech and jury trial. Fundamental rights in this context
mixed affirmative rights to get something from the state (protection of
the life, liberty, and property of the individual by traditional contract,
property, tort, and criminal law) with negative rights restraining the
state.
John Harrison has argued powerfully that the privileges and immu-
nities clause transformed the non-discrimination against out-of-state citi-
zens of Article IV into a prohibition on discrimination by the state
against classes of its own citizens. 63 As Harrison and Professor William
Nelson demonstrate, proponents often characterized the Fourteenth
Amendment as doing no more than guaranteeing equality 64 Fundamen-
tal rights described the area where discrimination was forbidden. Before
the Fourteenth Amendment was even proposed, Radical Republicans
argued in the Civil Rights Act debates that Congress had power to assure
all citizens of nondiscrimination in fundamental rights, because such dis-
crimination was a badge or incident of slavery. 65 Harrison pointed out
that the word "abridgment" covers any discrimination that provides
fewer affirmative rights for the African American than the white, and
thus the clause forbidding any state from abridging the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States worked to constitutionalize the
Civil Rights Act.266 Even Justice Field's dissent arguably did not go be-
yond an equal rights approach to the privileges that he broadly defined;
he complained that the slaughterhouse monopoly was invalid because it
unreasonably denied the butchers' rights available to the monopolists
and thus denied equality of right in pursuing a trade'
67
Professor Nelson has suggested that the vision of the amendment as
a guarantor of equality reconciles the puzzling inconsistencies that
plague attempts to understand the framer's intention with respect to in-
corporation: Bingham and Howard said the Bill of Rights were privileges
and immunities, yet the ratification debates did not discuss incorpora-
tion, and state constitutions and laws continued to maintain provisions
262. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,77 (1872).
263. Harrison, supra note 256, at 1385-474.
264. NELSON, supra note 255, at I15-19.
265. See supra note 30.
266. Harrison, supra note 256, at 1420-22.
267. NELSON, supra note 255, at 156-58. Field's "opinion is narrow because it held that not all
rights, but only fundamental rights, such as the right to engage in the common occupations, are within
the ambit of section one and thus subject to federal judicial control." Id. at 158. He "required only that
state regulations be reasonable, and he defined a reasonable regulation as one that applies generally
and equally to all." Id.
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that were inconsistent with those amendments26 Under an equality in-
terpretation of the amendment, the Bill of Rights were among the fun-
damental rights that must be extended without discrimination where they
were available, but the state was under no obligation to provide them.
Congress and the courts could secure the Bill of Rights by insisting that it
be extended to the blacks and northerners who had been excluded, but
states would be free to decide for themselves that no one would get some
particular guarantee. Thus, Nelson argues, Bingham and Howard could
refer to the Bill of Rights as privileges and immunities that would now be
enforced against the states without threatening to force any state to use
grand jury indictment instead of information or impose civil juries where
they had not been previously used.26
Miller's rejection of Article IV fundamental rights flew in the face of
the history and missed the opportunity to assure the equality in
fundamental rights that the framers aimed for. On the other hand,
limiting the clause to a requirement of equal treatment among citizens
with respect to fundamental rights violates the historical understanding
that freedom of speech was to be protected against state abridgment,
undermines unenumerated rights, and creates interpretative problems
for the equal protection clause. Although Harrison attempted to suggest
a form of incorporation akin to Amar's, his logic works the other way.
Equality resolves the paradox of incorporation in the teeth of contrary
state practices by denying incorporation. A doctrine that does not permit
any application of the Bill of Rights to the states is as ahistorical as one
that is limited to applying all of them.
3. Privilege and Immunities Include Fundamental Natural Rights
The language of privileges or immunities in the Fourteenth
Amendment was not limited to non-discrimination. As in the First
Amendment, "abridgment" goes beyond discrimination to forbid denials
of rights. Prohibiting opposition to slavery limits speech in ways the
framers would all oppose, yet it does not discriminate against classes of
people -only against ideas.
The equality interpretation of privileges or immunities either is re-
dundant in view of the equal protection clause or it requires that clause
to be read narrowly to apply to fewer rights than those that are funda-
mental, for example only to laws "protecting" existing rights. While
many supporters of the new amendment may have envisioned it in anti-
discrimination terms, others took a broader view.
268. Id. at i18-I9.
269. Id. at 117-19.
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Justice Bradley's fundamental rights interpretation had strong his-
torical support. It incorporated many, and possibly all, of the Bill of
Rights as part of the fundamental rights secured against state denial. A
number of the Republican supporters of the amendment spoke in abso-
lute rather than equality terms. Indeed, the consistent reference to fun-
damental rights in the debates point to protection of rights, not merely
equality. The absolute rights reading of the privileges and immunities
clause has real appeal. It is the only way the clause could effectively pro-
tect freedom of speech, which a number of speakers assumed would hap-
pen.
But, if fundamental rights include affirmative rights to property and
contract as well as negative rights, absolute rights threaten to lead to the
unwarranted extension of federal power that Miller feared and the Re-
publican party never openly avowed. That is what drove Justice Miller to
the status quo reading of the privileges and immunities clause.
Some Republicans supporting absolute rights offered a theory to ar-
gue that the clause did not destroy the role of the states.27° Proponents of
the Fourteenth Amendment emphasized that the Amendment would
have no effect on states that acted justly and did not threaten sover-
eignty.27" ' They made the Amendment seem like simple justice to which
no one could object. 72 Republicans assumed that states had acted to
regulate traditional common law rights, and the federal role would be
limited to invalidating the laws that were unreasonable, unfair, or un-
equal. 73 Professor Nelson wrote: "[E]ven if fundamental rights were de-
rived from higher law or were the entitlement of citizens independent of
state law, those rights could be enjoyed only if state legislatures created
rules and mechanisms for their enjoyment." '274 Thus, states would enact
basic laws of contract, property and tort. The Amendment only operated
as a check against improper state action, not as an authorization for af-
firmative contract, property or tort law of the federal government. Prop-
erty, for example, is an abstract right that exists concretely only in the
context of the state regulations that give it form. So long as those regula-
tions were reasonable and equal, the federal government could not affect
it.
Trisha Olson has argued, somewhat analogously, that the Amend-
ment embodied a natural law tradition that distinguished universal rights
applicable to all persons, which were protected by the due process and
270. Id. at 119-21.
271. See NELSON, supra note 255, at 114-25.
272. JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 44 (1984).
273. See NELSON, supra note 255, at 110-47.
274. Id. at i 19.
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equal protection clauses, from privileges and immunities that were based
on the particular communities to which the individual belonged.275 The
natural law analysis regards law as properly declarative of principles
rather than creating law, and the subset of privileges or immunities is de-
rived from communities whose relationships are governed by traditional
understandings. In a way, Professor Olson's analysis echoes Justice
White's selective incorporation decisions, which asked not whether a par-
ticular right was fundamental to fairness in any scheme of justice (a uni-
versal natural right), but whether it was fundamental in the context of
our system.276 Thus, privileges even in the natural law tradition are not
universal, but peculiar to the history and ethos of the nation. This leaves
the state as the proper source for basic laws of property, contract, and
procedure.
However, Justice Miller did not see fundamental rights as creating a
stable basis for analysis. He feared that if states were forbidden from
abridging affirmative obligations to protect the property and security of
the individual, the federal power under Section 5 to enforce the com-
mand leads inexorably to federal power to (i) determine whether the
protections are adequate and (2) to enact adequate laws in traditional
state law areas where they are not.277 If a state did not have a law of
property, how would the federal government enforce the command that
the state not abridge the fundamental right of property? If the federal
government could enact property laws under Section 5, it would take
over the definition of property. As long as privileges and immunities are
seen as the fundamental rights that a state owes its citizens, the logic ex-
pands federal legislative power beyond the scope the framers intended.
The responses to this point by the dissents in Slaughter-House were
not very reassuring. Justice Swayne wrote: "It is objected that the power
conferred is novel and large. The answer is that the novelty was known
and the measure deliberately adopted. The power is beneficent in its na-
ture, and cannot be abused. ' ,78 Justice Bradley replied to fears of a fed-
eral creation of civil and criminal codes that little action by Congress
would be required. But he did not deny that the amendment could be
construed to confer such power. "The great question is, What is the true
construction of the amendment? When once we find that, we shall find
275. See Trisha Olson, The Natural Law Foundation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 48 ARK. L. REV. 347 (1995).
276. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
277. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,77-78 (1872).
278. Id. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
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the means of giving it effect. The argument from inconvenience ought
not to have a very controlling influence in questions of this sort." '279
The best way to define the federal power to correct wrongs without
authorizing wholesale replacement of state power over traditional areas
of law is to define rights in terms of restrictions on state government
rather than rights to positive acts by the state. Then the limitation goes
into effect only upon state enactments. When Bingham made his second
proposal for the Fourteenth Amendment, the new language was de-
signed to deprive states of the power to do wrong, not to shift power to
the federal government to legislate in traditional areas.2 A protection
against state government should not shift enactment power to the federal
government. But, as Miller pointed out and as reflected in the contempo-
raneous congressional debates when the Slaughter-House Cases were be-
ing decided, a fundamental rights reading of privileges and immunities
does that, because fundamental rights include affirmative rights. In short,
the fundamental rights interpretation of Justice Bradley also violates the
intent of the framers.
The intent of the framers remains a slippery concept with too many
plausible accounts competing. As Professor Nelson wrote:
Only one historical conclusion can therefore be drawn: namely, that
Congress and the state legislatures never specified whether section one
was intended to be simply an equality provision or a provision protect-
ing absolute rights as well. Historical analysis of the framing and ratifi-
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot, by itself, resolve the
dilemma created by the conflicting commitments of those who partici-
pated in the process.
Although there are a variety of plausible accounts of the framers'
understanding of the privileges or immunities clause, Justice Miller's in-
terpretation of the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment failed to reflect any of them. The historical record plausibly
suggests that the framers intended to forbid inequality in privileges or
immunities and to establish limits that would forbid denials of the fun-
damental rights of citizens including at least some of the Bill of Rights.
By limiting the clause to a declaration of the status quo, Justice Miller
expressly chose sterility over the potential for expanded federal legisla-
tive power. However, the Slaughter-House Cases did not destroy recogni-
279. Id. at 124 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
28o. BOGEN, supra note I68, at 44-47.
281. NELSON, supra note 255, at 123. See also Timothy M. Bishop, Comments: The Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 142 (1984)
(arguing that no principled basis exists for choosing among competing versions of intent).
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tion of fundamental rights. Instead, its effect has been to shift analysis
from the privileges and immunities clause to the due process clause.
B. THE DECISION Is BAD POLICY
Although the Slaughter-House Cases did not accurately reflect the
history of the privileges or immunities clause, a misreading of history by
itself might not be sufficient grounds for overruling the decision. Indeed,
if the decision is otherwise beneficial, a reversal for the sake of historical
consistency might be foolish indeed. Destroying precedent for the sake
of a chimerical original intent is not a good idea. But advocates of reviv-
ing the fundamental rights or incorporation substance to the privileges or
immunities clause argue that the current tautological interpretation has
led to bad results. In short, they contend that the Court's use of the due
process clause to accomplish a similar result has undermined the legiti-
macy of the Court and cramped its ability to engage in creative interpre-
tations that would further respect individual rights.282
i. Substantive Due Process Is Linguistically Incoherent
The first objection to the use of the due process clause to accomplish
the tasks that the framers hoped would be accomplished by the privileges
or immunities clause is that it is linguistically incoherent. 83 Process refers
to procedures, so the clause deals only with lawful procedures. In John
Hart Ely's famous phrase: "'substantive due process' is a contradiction in
terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness.""2' Professor Tribe worried
that "the doctrinal shakiness of substantive due process may in turn un-
dermine public confidence in the institution of judicial review and in the
ability of judges honestly to interpret the dictates of the Constitution. ''25
This criticism is disingenuous. "Equal Protection" is a substantive
limit on legislatures, and the only textual source for finding the federal
government must provide equal protection is the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Virtually no one who wants to use the privileges
and immunities clause to replace the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment on the grounds that "due process" has no substantive
content is willing to treat Fifth Amendment due process as purely proce-
dural. 86 Thus, the linguistic incoherence argument is simply a red her-
ring.
282. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 1320-24. Most of the critics of the
historical inaccuracy of the decision also argue for a shift either expressly or implicitly.
283. Id. at 1317, 1323.
284. ELY, supra note 98, at is8.
285. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 1317.
286. Id. at 1319 n.37.
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Further, the attack on linguistic incoherence is misdirected. "Sub-
stantive due process" is a shorthand phrase for a concept that is not a
contradiction in terms. Process requires procedures for determining the
substance of the law as well as the facts. The procedures for finding that
the facts should result in deprivation of life, liberty, or property involve
the determination of what the law is-that it was passed by Congress and
not merely spouted by John Doe. The question, whether an authoritative
body passed the law, raises questions about the authority of that body.
The deprivation of life, liberty, or property because the facts fit the terms
of something which was not law cannot be a deprivation pursuant to law-
ful procedures. If the law is beyond the power of the legislature, there
are no procedures for the deprivation of liberty pursuant to it that would
be appropriate.
The linguistic move occurs in the interpretation of the word "lib-
erty" and not "process." What procedures are appropriate for the depri-
vation of liberty? The law infringing on liberty must be valid
constitutionally; otherwise, the application of the law to an individual
cannot be appropriate, regardless of the procedure. Procedural due
process reads "life, liberty, and property" as the mechanism for exerting
the coercive power of the state. In that event, due process is simply the
process for determining when the coercive power of the state is exercised
on an individual according to existing law. However, if liberty refers to
freedom of the individual from state restriction of their behavior, the is-
sue of appropriate procedures shifts from a determination of the applica-
bility of the law to an individual to whether the law is properly enacted
and that involves substance as well as legislative process. Linguistically,
there is no problem in saying that procedures that are premised on an
unconstitutional law violate due process. It is aqua pastelness.
Neither the general public nor the Supreme Court has been particu-
larly troubled by substantive due process as it applies to the incorpora-
tion of the First Amendment: How can a law that forbids opposing the
government be a law that affords the "appropriate" procedures for de-
priving someone of speech? We have been living with substantive due
process for more than a century with no apparent diminution in respect
for the Court. Indeed, the Court has probably gathered more support as
an institution in the latter part of the twentieth century than ever before,
especially in the area of incorporated rights.
The problem is that due process does not inherently contain any
substance to suggest what limits may exist on the legislative power. But
neither does it contain substance as to what procedures are due for appli-
cation in the trial process. We gather them from history and precedent
and the specific terms of other constitutional guarantees. The real com-
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plaint is not linguistic, but jurisprudential. Should unenumerated rights
be acknowledged, or does that give the Court too much power to frus-
trate the will of a democracy?
2. Substantive Due Process Precedents Undermine
Respect for the Court
A second objection raised to the continued use of the due process
clause to measure the substantive validity of laws is "the albatross of
Lochner.'287 The saga of that case has been frequently told: how the court
substituted "its own judgment, in the absence of any constitutional man-
date, for that of the legislature."' ' It is less frequently noted that Justice
Holmes's famed dissent retained a substantive component, conceding
that a law would deny "due process" if "it can be said that a rational and
fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would in-
fringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the tradi-
tions of our people and our law.2
9
The problem of Lochner was not linguistic and does not disappear
with the change in language from due process to privileges or immuni-
ties. Any assertion that an unenumerated right is a "privilege or immu-
nity" of citizenship in the United States will be controversial and raise
the argument that the Court is imposing its own views rather than inter-
preting the document. Once one gets beyond the express provisions of
the Bill of Rights, there is no general consensus on the mechanism for as-
certaining those rights. The difficulty with Lochner and Dred Scott does
not disappear by magic through changing clauses-like a snake shedding
its skin, it is still the same old natural law snake. It is hard to imagine an
opponent of the decision in Roe v. Wade suddenly saying that the Court
would have been acting appropriately if only it had placed its decision on
the privileges or immunities clause.
There is a substantial historical argument for the proposition that
the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to impose natural law limits
on the states. The Court was reluctant to venture into natural law inter-
pretation for the reasons Justice Iredell offered in Calder v. Bull."9 Prob-
lems of judicial interpretation and the majoritarian difficulty do not
287. Id. at 1319.
288. Id. at 1318; See MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE
DUE PROCESS FROM THE 189OS TO THE 1930S 5 (200).
289. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes J., dissenting).
290. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798): "The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard:
the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the court could properly say,
in such event, would be, that the legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act
which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natural justice." Id.
at 398-99 (Iredell, J., concurring).
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vanish depending on the clause used. But, as Justice Holmes seemed to
realize, the Fourteenth Amendment gave the Court the power and the
obligation to determine those principles, however deferential they should
be in applying them.29'
3. Privileges and Immunities Has Greater Potential
A third reason for overturning the Slaughter-House Cases is to inject
new life into the search for unenumerated rights. 9 The due process
clause seems to suggest that life, liberty, and property may all be denied
if the government does so with due process-but that privileges or im-
munities have no such conditions. 3 The move from due process to privi-
leges or immunities could free the court to take another look at natural
rights with the argument that the old precedents were created pursuant
to different language.
To the extent that a change in textual source unsettles precedents
and prods the court to reexamine its prior decisions, the benefits to indi-
vidual rights are at least questionable. First, the switch could destroy un-
enumerated rights by restricting privileges to stated constitutional rights
as the Slaughter-House revisionists seem to suggest. Second, the call for a
reexamination of our jurisprudence and revival of privileges and immuni-
ties comes from Justices Rehnquist and Thomas. A court dominated by
Thomas, Rehnquist, and Scalia would be likely to contract rather than
expand unenumerated rights as their dissents in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey94 suggest.29' If any expansion of unenumerated rights occurs, they
might well find additional protections for property rights.29 Third, if Pro-
fessor Tribe or Professor Michaelman secured a seat and became intel-
lectually dominant, the expansion of rights and thus the dominance of
the Court over the political process would be equally problematic. Al-
though Professor Tribe argues that initially the Court would be guided
by the precedents established under due process, there is no assurance
that change would follow the same line of progression.297 A court far
more active in imagining fundamental rights beyond existing traditions is
a threat to the political process as grave as one that gives total deference
to the legislature.
291. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
292. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Unfulfilled
Promise, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1143, 1147 (1992).
293. See TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 1319-20.
294. 505 U.S. 833 (1992)-
295. See id at 951-53. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2489-93 (2003) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
296. The concern of these justices for property rights may be seen in their dissents in Brown v. Le-
gal Foundation of Washington, 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1422-28 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
297. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 1328-3 1.
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C. CONGRESS IS A BETTER INSTITUTION TO INTERPRET THE CLAUSE
Professor James Fox has argued that the discussion of the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment and particularly the privileges or immuni-
ties clause has suffered from a misplaced focus. Instead of being con-
cerned with the Court's implementation of the historically ambiguous
intent of the framers, it is more appropriate, he argues, for the Court to
defer to congressional implementation of the Amendment through Sec-
tion 5. 8
Professor Fox appreciates the ambiguity of the history of the clause.
Like Professor Curtis, he notes that some of the framers held contradic-
tory goals of federal power to protect life, liberty, and property with con-
tinued state sovereignty over basic legal rights.2 He professes his
agnosticism on whether the clause should include natural rights beyond
enumerated ones, but contends that focus should be on congressional
definition of the privileges and immunities clause. He notes how Con-
gress broadly interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment in enacting the
Civil Rights Act of i866 as evidence for the understanding that congres-
sional enforcement power could make vague terms meaningful." °
Fox stresses the understanding of natural law fundamental rights as
affirmative protections of government. In this respect, he turns to the de-
bates over Civil Rights legislation after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment to show how congressmen interpreted the Amendment to
empower them to protect individuals from the violence of the Klan and
discrimination in places of public accommodations.3"'
Professor Fox urges Slaughter-House be overturned because there
was significant historical evidence for a broader view. He admits the his-
torical record "contains sufficient ambiguity that we must confront the
possibility that natural or fundamental rights beyond the Bill of Rights
could be encompassed by the Clause."'" He notes that modern interpre-
tations should look to the interpretations of Congress in the past and he
offers a suggestion of a "theory of interpretive enforcement, whereby
Congress, in enforcing the broad concept of privileges and immunities,
also interprets the Clause by particularizing it.... Congress may indeed
be the most appropriate body, historically and institutionally, to imple-
ment the specifics of citizenship privileges and immunities.""3 3
298. See Fox, supra note 6, at 165.
299. Id. at io8-o9 (citing Curtis, supra note 152).
300. Id. at x 9-22. Fox also applies this understanding to the Anti-Peonage Act. Id. at 122-27.
301. Id. at 126-48.




Many critics of the Slaughter-House decision point to the fear of
natural rights judicial interpretation as the cue for Miller's rejection of
fundamental rights. Tribe suggests that the court's adoption of substan-
tive due process undermines the case.3 4 However, it was primarily the vi-
sion of expanded congressional power that drove Miller's decision, and
the subsequent case law does nothing to undermine that concern. °5
V. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE FIVE: JUSTICE MILLER'S VINDICATION
Justice Miller did not cite the congressional debates, yet he based his
interpretation on the intention of the framers and ratifiers of the Four-
teenth Amendment. He reached his decision in the context of the same
debates over the extent of federal power that Professor Fox uses to argue
for an original intent to empower Congress. Miller's opinion rests on the
understanding that a "fundamental rights" interpretation of the privi-
leges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would neces-
sarily result in federal power to displace state law in traditional areas.
That result would have confounded the framers, so in the grand sense he
was following the intent of the framers even as he ignored their specific
intent. "We are convinced that no such results were intended by the
Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by the legislatures of
the States which ratified them."""
There is substantial support for the proposition that most of the par-
ticipants in the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment would have op-
posed conferring power on Congress to supplant the state as the source
of laws on contract, property, and tort.3 7The real question was whether
that result was a necessary consequence of interpreting Fourteenth
Amendment privileges or immunities broadly to include the fundamental
rights of citizens. A related question is whether other clauses better carry
out the framers' intent.
A. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE BETTER PROTECTS EQUALITY
The equality reading of the privileges and immunities clause could
probably be cabined to avoid congressional power to enact laws in tradi-
tionally local areas such as contract and tort. However, the narrow
304. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 1323.
305. Justice Miller was not frightened of unenumerated rights in every context as shown by his
decision in Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (2o Wall.) 655, 662-63 (1875) (holding in a diversity of
jurisdiction case, applying federal common law, that bonds issued by city to encourage manufacturer
to establish there were invalid because not issued for a public purpose).
306. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (I6 Wall.) 36,78 (1872).
307. See NELSON, supra note 255, at 64-90.
308. A number of congressmen objected to the first proposal of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which was in the form of a grant of power to Congress to secure privileges and immunities and equal
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equality interpretation is problematic as a reflection of the framers' in-
tent,3°9 and the framers' concerns for equality are better addressed by the
equal protection clause.
Even though some of the framers may have believed that the privi-
leges and immunities clause was concerned with equality, its wording
does not focus on that issue. The "equal protection of the laws" directs
attention to classifications in legislation, and that clause is the more ob-
vious candidate for assuring non-discrimination. The question was
whether the "protection of the laws" was limited to laws for the security
of the individual's person or property (e.g., relief for wrongful imprison-
ment and civil or criminal actions for injury to person or property) or
whether it should extend to all laws.3"' If it extends to all laws, it makes
an equality reading of the privileges and immunities clause redundant.
Linguistically there is no difficulty in discerning "protection" in any
law where a party seeks equality. The extension serves the purpose that
many had for the Fourteenth Amendment with several benefits. First,
the clause itself focuses attention on equality and the justifications for
distinctions, which was the concern of the framers. Our modem jurispru-
dence wrestles with understandings of equality based on the paradigm of
the illegitimacy of the use of race. This makes more sense than a focus on
the content of privileges.
Second, the idea of fundamental rights in connection with privileges
and immunities might limit the command of equality inappropriately.
The Court now recognizes that privileges and immunities in Article IV
apply to every unjustified discrimination against a citizen of another
state, not just ones that might be thought fundamental by natural law
reasoning, since any unjustified slap at the out-of-stater undermines the
common national citizenship that the clause was designed to create.3 '
Similarly, unjustified discrimination against a class of persons in any mat-
protection in the rights of life, liberty and property, on the grounds that it granted a general power to
legislate for the protection of life, liberty and property. CONo. GLOBE, 39th Cong., ist Sess. IO63-64
(1866) (Statement of Rep. Hale). Id. at 1087 (Statement of Rep. Davis); id. at IO95 (Statement of Rep.
Hotchkiss); id. at io82 (Statement of Sen. Stewart). One could argue that the language ultimately
adopted also permits uniform national laws to assure states do not deny equal protection as a means of
enforcing the prohibition on the denial of equality, but that would be a stretch. Note that Republicans
who expressed concern over the scope of federal power voted for the amendment in its current form.
Id. at 3042 (Senate vote for amendment includes Stewart); id. at 3149 (House vote for final version of
amendment includes Davis, Hale, and Hotchkiss).
309. See supra Part IV.A.2.
31o. Harrison argues that the Equal Protection Clause was limited to the "protection of the laws"
as a subset of government activity. The protection is for the personal security of the individual from
assault and violence done to person or property-but the definition of property rights would be out-
side the clause. Harrison, supra note 256, at 1433-51.
311. See BOGEN, supra note 168.
December 2003]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
ter undermines their status as a citizen. Thus, the broad application of
equal protection more appropriately serves the function of securing full
incorporation of the individual into society as a citizen, because it keeps
the focus on the discrimination rather than the "fundamentality" of the
subject matter.
Finally, leaving equality to the equal protection clause frees the
Court to pay attention to other influences on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Fundamental rights, whether enumerated or incorporated, would
be lost if the focus of the Fourteenth Amendment was on equality, be-
cause due process might easily be limited to the purely procedural realm.
B. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE BETrER PROTECTS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Unlike state abridgment of fundamental rights, which exists when
the state fails to provide adequate laws for the protection of life, liberty,
or property, the due process clause is triggered only by state action-
taking of life, liberty, or property. By attaching a substantive meaning to
due process, the idea of fundamental rights can be confined to state dep-
rivations. Consequently, as the framers intended, it is a restraint on the
state instead of an authorization to the federal government.
Critics complain that substantive due process is an oxymoron. But
due process began with the notion of the application of the law to an in-
dividual. If government did not act according to the law of the land, it
violated Magna Charta. If the law prohibits government from taking a
substantive action (a notion specific to the American Constitution), no
procedures for taking that action can be process that is "due" under the
law. This understanding of due process was reflected in early state case
law like Wynehamer,312 and in the invalidation of the Missouri Compro-
mise in Dred Scott."3 Even Justice Bradley's Slaughter-House Cases list
of fundamental rights contained in the Constitution said, "and above all,
and including almost all the rest, the right of not being deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." '314 Thus, the use of the
due process clause as the vehicle for fundamental rights is not inconsis-
tent with its history.1 5
312. Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 392-93 (1856).
313. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,450 (1857).
314. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (Wall.) 36, 118 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
315. See NELSON, supra note 255, at 57 (stating that the reconstruction committee switched from
"equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property" into separate clauses for equal protection
and due process). That might have been to assure procedural due process. "But a further possibility is
that the committee intended to incorporate a concept of substantive due process into the Fourteenth
Amendment. That concept had been adumbrated in Scott v. Sandford and in several state cases prior
to 1866, and there is no way of knowing whether the draftsmen of section one meant to incorporate
1Vol. 55:333
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Substantive due ?process also provides a framework for reconciling
incorporation issues." Representative Bingham and Senator Howard be-
lieved that the amendment would make the Bill of Rights applicable to
the states, and no one in Congress specifically said that they were wrong.
But neither proponents nor opponents discussed incorporation during
ratification, despite the impact it would have had, which strongly suggests
that people did not expect the amendment to alter state constitutional
law." 7 An equality interpretation of the amendment explains both facts,
denying effect to incorporation. The absolute view of rights, however,
reconciles the framer's statements with the ratifier's silence by positing
that states only considered themselves bound by what was fundamental.
States that had different procedures would not consider the constitu-
tional provision on the matter to relate to a fundamental right, so they
could support the amendment without fear that it would change their
processes. Inclusion in the Constitution would be evidence that a right
was fundamental, but not conclusive. Thus, Bingham and Howard could
believe rights were fundamental while states did not feel threatened with
change. This view does not resolve whether a particular right should be
incorporated, but it suggests that analysis for fundamentality is the ap-
propriate way to proceed. Although that analysis would have been possi-
ble under the privileges and immunities clause as well, it would have
swept fundamental affirmative rights within the ambit of Congress. Thus,
incorporation through the due process clause was the safer way to pro-
ceed.
One way in which the shift from privileges and immunities to due
process might pose problems for the framers is that fundamental rights
become applicable to all persons and not just to citizens. But this should
not be particularly troubling: The incorporation of procedural rights fits
notions of due process well, and equal protection protects aliens from
substantive discriminations unless there are sufficient grounds for distinc-
tion. Current doctrine on substantive due process and incorporation
permits some differences in treatment of aliens depending on where they
are located and what the grounds for difference may be. The results un-
der due process, therefore, remain consistent with the framer's intent.
it." Id. See also Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV.
L. REV. 366,46o (1911).
316. See David S. Bogen, The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections from the
Admission of Maryland's First Black Lawyers, 44 MD L. REV. 939, ioo7 n.225 (1985).
317. See JAMES E. BOND, No EASY WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 221-22 (1997); James E. Bond, The Original Understanding of the Four-
teenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio and Pennsylvania, i8 AKRON L. REV. 435 450 (1985); Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, supra note 256, at 32.
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C. FEDERALISM REMAINS GOOD POLICY
This article has suggested that the use of the equal protection clause
and the due process clause to assure equality and fundamental rights in-
cluding the Bill of Rights fulfills the historic design of the Fourteenth
Amendment more accurately than using the privileges or immunities
clause. While the framers may have intended privileges and immunities
to have the larger meaning, it would have undercut their concern for fed-
eralism to use privileges and immunities as the vessel for that meaning.
The other clauses of the Constitution have a sufficient linguistic and his-
toric basis to fulfill that task. Whether they should depends in large
measure on one's views of expanded federal power.
Critics may argue that state sovereignty is an outmoded barrier to
progressive activity. State's rights were the mantra for racists perpetrat-
ing a plethora of evils during segregation, and it may continue to be
hurled as a shield against progressive legislation on behalf of individuals.
Stopping gun possession near schools3' s and sexual assault3"9 is nationally
desirable, and so is overcoming state sovereign immunity with respect to
age32 and disability"' laws. Critics may argue that the slew of modern de-
cisions that have put up barriers to federal legislation are just bad, and
the Court should expand congressional power by reviving the privileges
and immunities clause to create a national form of government.
If the national government otherwise lacked power to deal with na-
tional problems, the argument that Miller's decision was bad policy
might be convincing. Unless Congress can protect the nation against
problems that need national solutions, the benefits of federalism are not
worth the price. But just as fundamental rights are adequately protected
by the due process and equal protection clauses, the affirmative grants of
power to Congress are sufficient to cope with national issues.
The Court still recognizes that Congress has power to enact legisla-
tion whenever it is needed to facilitate commerce or prevent it from
wreaking harm.322 It can regulate goods or activities that cross state
318. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 618-24 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (invalidating fed-
eral statute prohibiting the possession of guns near schools as beyond federal Commerce Clause
power).
319. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 634 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (invalidating fed-
eral statute giving cause of action to victim of crime of violence motivated by gender as beyond federal
Commerce Clause power).
320. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 93 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (holding ADEA
beyond federal power to enforce the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
321. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2oo) (holding ADA beyond federal power to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment).
322. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Implications of the New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: An
Evolutionary or Revolutionary Court?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 795, 840-41 (2003).
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lines, and it may also regulate any commercial activity that affects
commerce among the states."4 The only restriction on the exercise of the
commerce power has been with respect to noncommercial intrastate ac-
tivities where the need for national legislation is highly questionable.
Even here, if the states prove inadequate to the task and the noncom-
mercial activity threatens national interests, the federal government re-
tains power in a variety of ways to deal with the problem.325
The evil that state's rights rhetoric protected for so long was racial
discrimination. But the decision of the Supreme Court in Jones v.
Mayer"26 supported federal power to root out private acts of racial dis-
crimination pursuant to Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.3"7 This
expansive reading of federal power should be adequate to support the
anti-discrimination laws directed at race in housing, education and em-
ployment. Justice Miller said that the freedom of the former slaves was
the basic thrust of all the Amendments after the civil war:
[T]he one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation
of each, and without which none of them would have been even sug-
gested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly made
freemen and citizens from the oppressions of those who had formerly
exercised unlimited dominion over him.2
Congress has the power under current interpretations of both the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment to accomplish that purpose, if it
can be accomplished through legislation.
323. United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669,671 (1995) (per curiam).
324. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000) (upholding federal law prohibiting sale of personal
information obtained by state motor vehicle administrations).
325. E.g., Congress can use the spending power to induce states to enact desirable laws. See South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987) (upholding federal law withholding a portion of federal
funds unless state raised the legal drinking age for alcoholic beverages to twenty-one). Further, the
Court has not foreclosed the use of the Commerce Clause rationale for the situation when a noncom-
mercial act taking place within a state. Even in United States v. Morrison, Chief Justice Rehnquist said
"we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in
order to decide these cases." 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2ooo). Although suppression of violence may be a local
matter, the Court has not totally foreclosed federal action where that violence truly poses a national
problem beyond the capacity of the state to resolve. Indeed, the Court's limits on the commerce power
have not been fully articulated in a principled way and tend to be like Mr. Justice Stewart's famed
comment on obscenity: "I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, I97 (1964) (Stewart,
J. concurring).
326. 392 U.S. 409 (I968).
327. Id at 413. (Civil Rights Act of 1866 applies to private discrimination in the sale of property
and is a valid exercise of the enforcement power of the Thirteenth Amendment to abolish the badges
and incidents of slavery.)
328. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,71 (1872).
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The final concern for states' rights is that individual states may lag
behind the federal government in recognizing individual human rights
not specifically protected by the Constitution -rights against discrimina-
tion because of age, disability, or gender orientation. When denial of
such rights impacts interstate commerce, Congress can still regulate it.329
Although the recent sovereign immunity doctrine decisions preclude the
creation of a private right of action against the state, federal law may still
be enforced through Ex Parte Young injunctions and civil and criminal
enforcement against the states by the federal government itself.330 Fur-
ther, the Court has shown this term that it is willing to find congressional
power to combat behavior that might be rooted in gender or other sus-
pect or quasi-suspect classifications."'
In short, Congress has sufficient power to deal directly or indirectly
with every form of national problem. The decisions of the Court, how-
ever, demand that Congress demonstrate that the problem is a national
one when its scope is not obvious. This demand, and the need to use less
direct instruments such as the spending power, force Congress to con-
front the institutional issue as to which level of government can best deal
with the problem. It also makes state sovereignty a practical reality, so
that most problems will be understood as state responsibility. There are
at least three advantages to maintaining federalism and not interpreting
the privileges and immunities clause to confer a general congressional
power to legislate on personal security and property rights: it maximizes
popular satisfaction, it promotes experimentation, and it provides a
model on the international level to reconcile national factions.
The utilitarian argument for federalism is that it maximizes satisfac-
tion. A rule that satisfies the majority in each of the fifty states will be a
much larger number than a rule that satisfies the national majority but
overrides local state majorities. The wrinkle is the weight to be assigned
the desire of persons in one state to have their rule adopted in a
neighboring state where there is no significant commercial effect on the
first state from such an adoption. Congressional power should be suffi-
cient to enable a national majority to overcome local majorities when
that desire is at a high level, but the stumbling blocks that the Court has
329. Thus, the application of the ADA and the ADEA to businesses was not questioned in the
decisions that invalidated a private right of action against the states.
330. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,747-48 (i999).
331. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977 (2003) (holding that Congress may
abrogate state immunity and provide private cause of action for family leave act violation as measure




raised to preserve federalism may help preserve local preferences where
the national interest is low.
The states have always been famed as the laboratories of experimen-
tation.33 With respect to individual rights, the slow expansion of laws
prohibiting discrimination based on gender orientation suggests that
states may be even more progressive than the national government, a
government whose laws often preempt local attempts to grapple with is-
sues. It may well be that the huge amounts of financing necessary to run
for national office create a polarization that does not well reflect a major-
ity. Raising money is easier for the more ideological candidates on each
side, and this promotes more strife and less cooperation in the national
legislature.333 Local campaigns are cheaper and need not be as ideologi-
cally divisive. That creates the possibility of legislatures more amenable
to working together on problems and creating new solutions.
Finally, American federalism has been a model throughout the
world for bringing together diverse peoples under a larger governmental
structure.334 The utility of a national economic policy and a national for-
eign policy is apparent, but the tug of different ethnic and cultural back-
grounds makes this difficult. The breakaway republic of Chechnya in
Russia and the fear of separate status for Kurds in Turkey suggest the
problems nations may have with significant internal groups with different
interests. The lack of autonomy for Tibet gives the Republic of China on
Taiwan pause about uniting with the Peoples Republic on the Mainland.
If the warning of the anti-federalists comes true, that states cannot main-
tain their separate sovereignty under a national government, the United
States will no longer be the beacon on the hill that gives hope for resolv-
ing this kind of international problem. A viable federalism is therefore
important, not just for the internal purposes of maximizing popular satis-
faction and fostering experimentation, but to demonstrate to a fractious
world that dual sovereignty is a viable form of government.
332. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.")
333. See MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 14-I6 (2003).
334. The European Union is one way in which countries have come together in a single governing
structure while maintaining separate sovereignty. Canada and Australia are just two of the other na-
tions that have adopted a federal model. In Australia's case, the country carefully considered and re-




This Article does not argue that every decision of the Court has
been perfect-only that the issues raised on fundamental rights and in-
corporation are the right ones. The framers did not have answers for
modern questions, but left it for the considered judgment of future gen-
erations. They did, however, provide a framework to consider whether
guarantees of individual rights are fundamental. They sought to assure
equality in the laws and to prevent government from acting in ways that
trampled on individual rights, but they failed to work through the appli-
cation of the doctrine. The problems that the courts wrestle with today-
bounding the court's discretion with respect to fundamental rights, de-
termining what classifications deny appropriate understandings of equal-
ity-are the very problems that the framers left open for the future.
After more than a century, the Slaughter-House Cases have with-
stood the test of time. Justice Miller's opinion wisely maintained federal-
ism without undercutting the ability of Congress and the court to secure
the rights of emancipated slaves through the equal protection clause. It
left the door open for the future to discover and apply fundamental
rights to restrain state governments through the due process clause,
without transferring power to the federal government to supplant the tra-
ditional local law of the states.
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